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THE DOCTRINE OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION IN UGHT OF ROBUST 
PEACEKEEPING 
T. MODIBO 0CRAN* 
Abstract: Since the 19th century, humanitarian interventions have 
often been treated as suspect because they may be used as mere vehicles 
for national aggrandizement, imposition of puppets in power, or for the 
institution of political and economic systems detested by the indigenous 
population. However, it is also recognized that atrocities do occur within 
states, which shock the conscience of humankind and trigger the urge 
to intervene to save defenseless people from carnage, starvation, and 
other inhuman conditions. The problem is to identify a set of criteria 
and forms of behavior that will enable us to distinguish between 
intervention as aggression and genuine humanitarian intervention. 
Moreover, even if we see humanitarian intervention as a moral 
imperative in a Kantian sense, we would still need to establish its validity 
as a legal construct. This Article revisits the criteria for making the 
relevant distinctions and concludes that with all the operational 
problems of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping, collective 
intervention by the U.N., or regional bodies sanctioned by the U.N. 
Security Council, is the approach most likely to conform with the U.N. 
Charter paradigm for conflict resolution. 
* Dean's Club Research Professor of Law; Fellow, Intellectual Property Center, The 
University of Akron, Akron, Ohio. LL.B., B.L., University of Ghana; M.L.I., Ph.D., Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Madison. Professor Ocran reserves the right to publish a form of this 
Article in an upcoming book. 
1 
2 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:1 
Are international [legal] norms effective, or is raw military might 
the only thing that can stop the villainous Foday Sankohs of the 
world? Is humanitarian intervention impractical, or is there some 
way of balancing both sovereign rights and global values?1 
-Michael Hirsh 
It might be best for all parties to let minor wars burn themselves 
out .... Policy elites should actively resist the emotional impulse to 
intervene in other people's wars-not because they are indifferent 
to human suffering, but precisely because they care about it .... 2 
-Edward N. Luttwak 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1970s, dramatic instances of humanitarian intervention 
have brought the subject of such intervention to the forefront of in-
ternational law discourse. In the 1990s, humanitarian intervention 
efforts occurred in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, and the former Yugo-
slavia. The intervention in fugoslavia was, of course, not a simple case 
of humanitarian intervention. It involved an attempt to stem the tide 
of threats to international peace and security, as various parts of the 
former Yugoslavia attempted to establish their own national sover-
eignty.3 But there was also a humanitarian aspect to it. It was a mixture 
of humanitarian intervention and U.N. Charter Chapter 7 enforce-
ment measures in aid of international peace and security.4 Other not-
so-distant examples of humanitarian intervention include Vietnam's 
invasion of Cambodia and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979. 
The U .S.-led coalition that occupied the Kurdish areas of northern 
Iraq in 1990 in the aftermath of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis also justified 
their action in terms of humanitarian intervention. 
The doctrine and manifestation of humanitarian intervention 
have remained highly controversial over the centuries, whether the 
intervention is carried out by individual states, groups of states, or by 
the U.N. under the aegis of collective security. Debate over the doc-
1 Michael Hirsch, Calling All Regio-Cops: Peacekeeping's Hybrid Future, 79 FoREIGN AFF., 
Nov.-DEc. 2000, at 2, 2. 
2 Edward N. Luttwak, Give War A Chance, 78 FoREIGN AFF.,July-Aug. 1999, at 36, 37. 
3 See TIM JUDAH, THE SERBS: HISTORY, MYTH AND THE DESTRUCTION OF YuGOSLAVIA 
185-90 (1997); see a/so MARCUS TANNER, CROATIA: A NATION FORGED IN WAR 253-74 
(1997). 
4 See T. Modibo Ocran, How Bkssed Were the U.N. Peacekeepers in Former Yugoslavia, 18 
Wis. INT'L LJ. 193, 196-98 (2000) (providing an in-depth account of the \Ugoslav crisis). 
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trine is very much alive today, flaring up in moments of national and 
international humanitarian crises. There are those who, like Michael 
Hirsh, take the validity of the doctrine for granted and mostly worry 
about practical and effective ways of carrying it out. When Hirsh 
wrote that the debate over humanitarian intervention was "for the 
most part, a phony debate,''5 he was merely questioning the utility of a 
debate focusing on the role of the United States and the U.N. as the 
primary undertakers of peacekeeping operations, while regional 
peacekeeping efforts remained relatively untapped. Hirsh was not 
questioning the seriousness of the debate over the doctrine itself. 
At the same time, we encounter scholars like Edward Luttwak, 
who revel in their disavowal of humanitarian intervention even in 
situations of great humanitarian tragedies such as Croatia, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo during the 1990s. Indeed, Luttwak is moved by the pro-
fundity of "war's paradoxical logic" of bringing peace by letting the 
warring factions burn themselves out. Consequently, he views disin-
terested interventions as "a new malpractice that could be curtailed."6 
Does international law permit unilateral or collective resort to 
force in order to remedy a situation of wide-scale deprivation of the 
most fundamental human rights committed by a state against its own 
nationals, or by one state against the nationals of another state? Put 
differently, the problem is one of meshing the goals of global conflict-
minimization through avoidance of external aggression with the 
global protection of human rights. The basic issues in this debate thus 
posit the problem of sovereignty versus the protection of certain uni-
versal human rights. In modern history, the principle of sovereignty 
was established under the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which 
brought an end to the Thirty-Year War and a long period of destruc-
tive religious conflict in Europe. The principle of noninterference in 
the affairs of another state is viewed as a corollary of the more basic 
principle of sovereignty, which, at the same time, continues to lose 
some of its absoluteness through the entry into a host of treaties by 
nation-states. Sovereignty indeed has lost much of its claim since the 
formation of the U.N., which is seen as a reflection of the community 
of nations and therefore a kind of auto-limitation on what individual 
states can do as responsible citizens of the world.7 
5 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 2. 
6 Luttwak, supra note 2, at 44. 
7 See Oscar Schachter, The U.N. Legal Order: An Overview, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 3-26 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997); see also Paul C. Szasz, General 
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This Article considers some of the typical doctrinal positions for 
and against humanitarian intervention and suggests that the interven-
tions carried out by the U.N. neutralize most of the trenchant attacks 
on such forcible intervention. At the same time, the U.N.'s actions 
raise peculiar institutional problems and continue to raise difficult, 
debatable international legal issues. 
I. GENERAL NOTIONS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Elsewhere, this writer has outlined the place of peacekeeping 
within the global conflict resolution mechanism and described the 
attributes of traditional or classical peacekeeping. 8 Peacekeeping is 
often contrasted with other forms of U.N. involvement in military and 
political crises around the world. First, there are the "peace enforce-
ment" measures taken under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, involving 
the explicit use of force to pursue an agreed end, such as the Gulf 
War of 1990-91. Second, there is peace-making, "the active involve-
ment of the U.N. in the search for a peaceful settlement, through 
mediation and the use of good offices. ''9 Third, there is "post-conflict 
peace-building," which Boutros Ghali has described as an "action to 
identify and support structures designed to strengthen and consoli-
date peace ... often [started] prior to the end of a conflict, to hasten 
the establishment of peace on firm foundations. "10 Undertakings such 
as the repatriation and reintegration of refugees, mine clearance, and 
disarmament fall under the rubric of peace building.11 
Part of the problem of U.N. peacekeeping in Croatia, and even 
more so in Bosnia, in the early 1990s, was that while its mandate had 
some enforcement aspects, it was not conceived as a peace enforce-
ment operation in the manner of the 1991 "Desert Storm" operation 
during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. In the case of direct peace enforce-
ment operations, the warring parties' lack of consent to third-party 
intervention means that the interventionists assume a hostile envi-
Law-making Processes, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-64 (Christo-
pher C. Joyner ed., 1997). 
B See Ocran, supra note 4, at 196--98. 
9 Spyros Economides & Paul Taylor, F!ffmer Yugoslavia, in THE NEw INTERVENTIONISM 
1991-1994 UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE IN CAMBODIA, FORMER YuGOSLAVIA AND SOMA-
LIA 59, 64 (James Mayall ed., 1996). 
10 BOUTROS BoUTROS-GHALI, BUILDING PEACE AND OEVELOPMENT-1994: ANNUAL RE-
PORT ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION at 246--57, U.N. Sales No. £.95.1.3 (1994). 
u See id. at 265. 
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ronment and adopt the appropriate rules of military engagement, as 
well as appropriate levels of combat readiness and equipment. But 
what if, as in the case of The United Nations Protection Force (UN-
PROFOR), the peacekeeping operation established for the former 
Yugoslavia in 1992, and The United Nations Confidence Restoration 
Operation UNCRO) mandated for Croatia in 1995, the forces main-
tained a peacekeeping mode with the old rules of engagement, while 
being ordered to distribute humanitarian assistance in the midst of 
war? 
In the same publication already referred to, this writer has laid 
out the modus operandi of traditional peacekeeping.l2 First, there is the 
presence of supposedly disinterested outside assistance in a war situa-
tion to help the warring parties disengage themselves. The outsider is 
not expected to side with one party in order to win its objectives. 
Thus, the Korean and Iraqi missions of 1951 and 1990, respectively, 
were not peacekeeping operations, but rather enforcement measures 
carried out under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. Second, the disin-
terested outside assistance, e.g., U.N., normally enters the theatre with 
the initial agreement of the parties, usually after an armistice or cease-
fire agreement has been signed by the parties. Third, the rules of 
military engagement provide only for appropriate self-defense. The 
soldiers are therefore lightly armed, and are almost always outgunned 
by the disputants they are required to monitor. Fourth, at least in the 
early days, U.N. peacekeeping was confined to international, as dis-
tinct from civil wars, with the great exception of the Congo Crisis of 
1960-64. 
There have been new horizons in the modalities of peacekeeping 
as the international community becomes more embroiled in contain-
ing civil wars or other crises involving both domestic and interna-
tional threats to peace. Some have described this new tendency in 
peacekeeping operations as "robust peacekeeping. "13 Goulding names 
it "cease-fire enforcement, . . . a forceful variant of the traditional 
peacekeeping. "14 Irrespective of the terminology adopted, the com-
12 SeeOcran, supra note 4, at 196-99. 
13 "Peace operations have changed since the end of the Cold War. They are no longer 
limited to the interposition of small numbers of passive, unarmed observers. Today, they 
also include more complex and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to 
achieve a range of political and humanitarian objectives." UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, April 1994, 33 ILM 
705, 706, at 809-10 (emphasis supplied) [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF STATE]. 
14 Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 69 INT'L AFF. 451, 459 
(1993). 
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mon thrust is to emphasize various modes of filling the "doctrinal 
void" betw-een peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which Ruggie 
has so aptly discerned: 
Peacekeeping essentially attempts to overcome a coordina-
tion problem betw-een the tw"o adversaries: the peacekeeper 
seeks to ensure that both parties to a conflict understand the 
agreed-upon rules of the game and that compliance with or 
deviation from these rules is made transparent. Enforce-
ment, on the other hand, is akin to a game of chicken: the 
international community, through escalating measures that 
threaten war-making and military defeat, attempts to force 
an aggressor off its track. Strategically, the United Nation's 
new domain resembles a suasion game: because there is no 
clear-cut aggressor, U.N. forces, by presenting a credible 
military threat, seek to convince all conflict[ing] parties that 
violence will not succeed. International force is brought to 
bear not to defeat but to neutralize the local forces .... The 
military objective of the strategy then is to deter, dissuade 
and deny.15 
Robust peacekeeping, or peacekeeping with credible and effec-
tive force, becomes especially relevant in situations where peacekeep-
ers are asked to provide humanitarian assistance in the face of opposi-
tion by a warring faction seeking to use starvation or disease as 
instruments of war. Its relevance is even more apparent when peace-
keepers are called upon to intervene in the prevention of genocide, 
carnage, or other acts of mayhem in the context of an ongoing civil 
war. 
In the first crisis situation-the provision of humanitarian assis-
tance-the peacekeepers will either have to surrender their mandate 
or force their way into the theatre of conflict to deliver food, medical 
supplies, and other forms of life-sustaining necessities. It is possible to 
advance a rather broad interpretation of "self-defense" to include the 
authority of U.N. peacekeepers to open fire on hostile soldiers at a 
roadblock bent on denying passage to a humanitarian convoy.l6 How-
ever, local U.N. commanders, very much aware of their organization's 
institutional weakness, hardly attempt to live out this notion of self-
15 John Gerard Ruggie, Wandering in the Void: Charting the U.N.'s New Strategic &le, 72 
FoREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 26, 29. 
16 See Goulding, supra note 14, at 455. 
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defense. The initial consent of the parties in conflict to the deploy-
ment of peacekeepers may even be withdrawn completely, at least for 
a period of time. A historic example of this possibility is the with-
drawal by then-Egyptian President Nasser in May, 1967 of his coun-
try's consent to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) to 
deploy troops on its territory during the 1956 Egyptian-Israeli 
conflict.17 
Goulding cites the examples of U.N. operations in Congo (Kinsa-
sha) from 1960-64, and Somalia from 1992-95 to illustrate the point 
that such operations may initially be deployed as traditional 
peacekeeping operations, but could subsequently be transmuted into 
operations with authority to use force on a considerable scale when it 
becomes clear that the traditional mode would not achieve the overall 
purpose of maintaining peace and security.l8 In the case of Somalia, 
the U.N. Secretary-General, after recognizing that traditional 
peacekeeping could not effectively deal with the situation, compelled 
the Security Council to establish the United Nations Task Force 
(UNISOM I or Task Force) led by the United States, whose assign-
ment was to build a more secure environment for humanitarian deliv-
eries. A regular peacekeeping operation would then take over after 
the military situation had been put under control. The Task Force was 
ineffective because of the absence of the requisite degree of compul-
sion, as well as the presence of warlords in control of various parts of 
the territory, which made it unworkable for the U.N. commanders to 
establish an all-embracing agreement on the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. Thus, the Security Council subsequently had to establish a 
new U.N. force under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter (UNISOM II, 
1993-95) with the mandate to enforce secure conditions for humani-
tarian operations more effectively.l9 
In the former Yugoslavia, warlords operating within the self-
proclaimed Republic of Serb Krajina in Croatia, soldiers of the rene-
gade Muslim enclave controlled by Fikret Abdic in the Bihac Republic 
of Bosnia, as well as the political-military establishment in the Bosnian 
Serb Republic based in Pale, Bosnia, were all engaged in frequent ob-
structions of humanitarian convoys of UNPROFOR and UNHCR mov-
ing from Croatian ports and cities into so-called U.N. safe areas in 
Bosnia. When the task of containment became unmanageable for 
17 See id. at 454. 
Js See id. at 452-53. 
19 See id. at 459. 
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UNPROFOR in Bosnia, the U.N. Security Council established, under 
Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, a peace enforcement unit composed 
of NATO member-states linked to the Office of the U.N. Secretary 
General in a rather confusing chain of command. 2° 
In the second crisis situation, involving attempts to stop atrocities 
such as genocide or mass killings, the main postulate of traditional 
peacekeeping, namely, the deployment of non-lethal weapons in a 
posture of self-defense, clearly becomes inapplicable. This was mani-
fested most tragically in the inability of U.N. forces to stop the massa-
cre of Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serbs in Sebrenica in 1995.21 In 
both crisis situations, the measures required to carry out the assigned 
tasks or to meet the expectations of the international community 
could hardly be distinguished from forcible humanitarian interven-
tion. 
Humanitarian intervention has been defined as "the justifiable 
use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another 
state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed 
the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason 
and justice. "22 Oppenheim defined intervention generally as "dictato-
rial interference by a state in the affairs of another state for the pur-
pose of maintaining or ordering the actual conditions of things. "23 
Humanitarian intervention does indeed take a variety of forms: mate-
rial assistance through relief, aid, or sanctions which consist of coer-
cive, but nonmilitary pressure to end abusive practices; and the dis-
patch of military forces to remedy massive human atrocities. It is the 
latter form that is most forcefully challenged or contradicted in the 
current debate. 
Humanitarian intervention encompasses armed responses to cer-
tain acts, whether done by outsiders or compatriots, which "shock the 
moral conscience of mankind." Such acts have been noted to include: 
(1) genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and other atrocities involving loss of life on a massive scale; (2) inter-
ference with the delivery of humanitarian relief to endangered civil-
ian populations; and (3) the collapse of civil order entailing substan-
20 See infra Part IV.B. 
2! See JuDAH, supra note 3, at 239-40; see also Luttwak, supra note 2, at 38. 
22 E. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (1931);jean-Pierre Fonteyne, The Customary 
International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the UN. 
Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L LJ.203, 204 (1974). 
23 LASSA F.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 87th ed. 
1955). 
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tial loss of life, in situations where it is impossible to identify any 
authority capable of granting consent to international involvement to 
help restore order. 24 
Humanitarian intervention may be carried out by a single state 
(individual intervention) or by a group of states (collective interven-
tion). Either form could be "unilateral" or unauthorized. Unilateral 
intervention is essentially characterized by the lack of formal authori-
zation from any universal or regional competent body. Unilateral in-
tervention is thus distinguished from intervention by armed forces 
under the direct control of the U.N., such as in Korea, UNEF in Suez, 
Egypt, ONUC in Congo, or of appropriate regional organizations 
such as the Organization of American States intervention in the Do-
minican Republic in 1965. 
II. jusTIFICATION FOR HuMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A REviEW oF 
THE DocTRINAL ARGUMENTS 
The traditional doctrine at customary international law often 
upheld the proposition that humanitarian intervention was never 
fully acknowledged as part of positive law.25 In 1863, Sir W. V. Har-
court, writing on some perennial questions of international law, pos-
tulated that, "in the case of intervention as that of revolution, its es-
sence is illegality, and its justification is its success. "26 However, it 
remained an open question whether the justification for humanitar-
ian intervention was to be seen solely in terms of its success-like Kel-
sen's "principle of effectiveness" in the case of revolutions27-or 
whether one could establish some plausible moral and legal 
justifications for intervention without reference to its results. 
In order to test the proposition that humanitarian intervention 
had never been accepted as part of customary international law, Fon-
teyne reviewed state practice starting from the 19th century, including 
examples from southern and eastern Europe. He cites the interven-
tion in Greece by France, U.K, and Russia, between 1827 and 1830, to 
stop the massacres in the Greek areas of the Ottoman empire; the in-
tervention by France in Syria from 1860 to 1861 following the massa-
24 See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1219-20 (3d ed. 
1999). 
25 See Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 46, 
46 (1946). 
26 Jd.; HARCOURT, LETTERS OF HISTORICUS ON SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAw 14 (1843). 
27 See Hans KELSEN, WHAT IS jUSTICE? 290 (1945). 
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ere in the Lebanese region of that country;28 and the Russian inter-
vention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria from 1876 to 1878, which 
was justified on humanitarian grounds. There was also the interven-
tion in Macedonia from 1903 to 1908 and 1912 to 1913 by Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Serbia against the Turkish attempt to convert the people 
of that area to the Turkish religion and culture.29 Fonteyne concludes 
that there was some consistency in practice since the latter part of the 
19th century: 
While divergence certainly existed as to the circumstances in 
which resort could be had to the institution of humanitarian 
intervention as well as to the manner in which such opera-
tions were to be conducted, the principle itself was widely, if 
not unanimously, accepted as an integral part of customary 
internationallaw.30 
In spite of these historic examples, the debate on humanitarian 
intervention continued, and remains unabated. There are two levels 
to the debate: (1) whether, as a matter of principle, interventionism 
ought to be allowed irrespective of the legal status of the doctrine; 
and (2) whether humanitarian intervention is permissible under in-
ternational law. In the words of Fonteyne, there is the "question of 
principle" on the one hand, and the "question of norms" on the 
other. 31 Picking up the debate from the middle of the 19th century, 
the dividing line appeared to have been drawn between the support-
ers of sovereign independence and nonintervention, and the adher-
ents of humanitarianism. 
A. The Philosophical Debate: The Q)i,estion of Principle 
The Italian philosopher Mamiani, who was also described as the 
leader of the Italian "non-intervention" or "neo-nationalist" school of 
thought,32 claimed in 1880 that the actions and crimes of the people 
within the limits of its territory do not infringe upon anyone else's 
rights, and thus, do not give a basis for a legitimate intervention. 
"Truly what positive right of the other peoples does one infringe 
28 There was no actual mention of humanitarian intervention in that case, but it was 
quite clear that the real driving force for intervention was the outrage over the massacre of 
civilians. 
29 See Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 212-13. 
30 ld. at 235. 
31 See id. at 214, 226. 
32 See id. at 215. 
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upon? Have you ever heard it said that the law requires that one be 
only confronted with good example?"33 The 19th century French 
scholar Pradier-Fodere also stated: 
The acts of inhumanity however condemnable they may be, 
as long as they did not affect nor threaten the right of other 
states, do not provide the latter with a basis for lawful inter-
vention as no state can stand up in judgment of the conduct 
of others; as long as they do not infringe upon the rights of 
other powers or of their subjects, they remain the sole busi-
ness of the nationals of the countries where they are commit-
ted.34 
Latin American scholars, traditional champions of the noninter-
ventionist principle, took the same approach in the early 20th cen-
tury. L. Pereira, writing in 1902, postulated that, "[i]nternal oppres-
sion, however odious and violent it may be, does not affect either 
directly or indirectly external relations and does not endanger the 
existence of other states. Accordingly it cannot be used as a legal basis 
for use of force and violent means. "35 Other scholars point to the pos-
sible abuse of the doctrine of intervention. Intervening military forces 
are supposed to strive for neutrality in civil wars and are to be held 
accountable. Yet, the picture often created is that these forces are al-
ready a party to the tragedy when they arrive. "It is a delusion to think 
that they are neutral or above the fray. "36 There is a fear that if hu-
manitarian intervention were allowed, it would give powerful states an 
excuse to intervene in the affairs of weaker states for selfish political 
purposes.37 It is argued that such a right might indeed open a Pan-
dora's Box, as there is no country that can claim a complete absence 
of human rights violations in its territory. 38 
Nevertheless, could one argue that acceptance of humanitarian 
intervention reflects a fundamental value choice that justifies some 
~3 CARNAZZA-AMARI, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN TEMPS DE PAIX 557 (Mon-
tanari-Revest trans. 1880), quoted in Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 215. 
34 PRADIER-FODERE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EUROPEEN ET AMERICAIN 655 
(1885), quoted in Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 216. 
~5 Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 217 (citing L. PEREIRA, PRINCIPIOS DE DIREITO INTER-
NACIONAL 97-98 (1902)). 
~6 Alex De Waal & Rakiya Omaar, Can Military Intervention Be "Humanitarian?," 24 
MIDDLE E. REP. 8, 8 (1994). 
37 Farook Hassan, RealPolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict-
''Humanitarian Intervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 859, 881-82 (1981). 
38 See LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 145 (2d ed. 1979). 
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degree of interference in the political independence and sometimes 
even territorial integrity of the state intervened in? Lillich has noted 
that, "a prohibition of violence is not an absolute virtue [and must] be 
weighed against other values as well. "39 Grotius, the Dutch pioneer of 
international law, was among those who felt that international rela-
tions and international law ought to have a place for humanitarian 
intervention. He wrote: 
Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies were 
formed, the ruler of each claimed some especial right over 
his subjects ... but if a tyrant ... practices atrocities towards 
his subjects which no just man can approve, the right of hu-
man social connection is not cut off in such case.40 
Arntz added his voice to the Grotian theme, stating: 
When a government, even acting within the limits of its right 
of sovereignty, violates the rights of humanity, either by 
measures contrary to the interests of other [s] tates, or by ex-
cessive injustice or brutality, which seriously injure our mor-
als or civilization, the right of intervention is legitimate. For, 
however worthy of respect the rights of sovereignty and in-
dependence of states may be, there is something even more 
worthy of respect, namely the law of humanity or of human 
society that must not be violated.41 
Similarly Fiore, writing in 1885, asserted that, "inaction and indiffer-
ence of other states would constitute an egocentric policy contrary to 
the rights of all; for whoever violates international law to the disadvan-
tage of anybody violates it not only to the detriment of the person di-
rectly affected but as against all civilized states. "42 Indeed, one could 
say that by the turn of the 19th century, the principle of humanitarian 
intervention as a philosophical concept was strongly embedded in 
intellectual discourse. Decades later, Jenks would insist that, "the 
world community must recognize the need for external intervention 
39 Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, 22 NAVAL WAR C. REv. 56, 
65 (1970). 
40 HUGONIS GROTIUS, 2 DE jURE BELLI ET PACIS 439 (William Whewell trans. 1853). 
41 Rorin:Jacquemyms, Note Sur La Theorie du Droit d'Intervention, 8 REvuE DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 675 (1876), quoted in fonteyne, supra note 22, 
at 220. 
42 P. FIORE, NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 524-25 (Charles Antoine trans., 
1885). 
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in cases not covered by the right of self-defense so defined [in Article 
51 ofthe U.N. Charter], in which the world interest or the conscience 
of mankind is involved .... "43 
B. Legal Permissibility of Humanitarian Intervention: The QJJ,estion 
of Norms 
Some eminent scholars often expressed doubts as to the legal 
status of the doctrine. Thus, Winfield stated in 1924 that, "whether 
[humanitarian intervention] is legal ... must in the present state of 
practice be regarded as an unsolved point. "44 Lauterpacht also admit-
ted that, "[t]he doctrine of humanitarian intervention has never be-
come a fully acknowledged part of positive international law. "45 Of 
particular concern were the mixed motives with which states generally 
became involved in such intervention, as well as the real fear of abuse 
of such a doctrine. On the other hand, Fonteyne has already cited the 
classic examples of 19th century military humanitarian intervention 
to make a point that such intervention as a matter of state practice 
was quite acceptable under customary intemationallaw.46 
In the period immediately preceding the First World War, the 
majority of legal scholars who wrote on the subject accepted the legal-
ity of humanitarian intervention. While some scholars continued to 
reject the validity of the doctrine, there were others that tried to rec-
oncile the apparent contradiction in these basic positions. Lawrence, 
for instance, emphasized the difference between law and policy, giv-
ing priority to the latter in exceptional circumstances. 47 This is the so-
called "double level approach," in which an attempt is made to skirt 
the strictly legal analysis and to suggest that there is no inconsistency 
with taking a legal as well as a moral position on the matter. 
Lawrence wrote, "[a]n intervention to put a stop to barbarous 
and abominable cruelty is 'a high act of policy above and beyond the 
domain of law.' It is destitute of technical legality but it may be mor-
ally right and even praiseworthy to a high degree. "48 Similarly, while 
43 C. WILFRED jENKS, A NEw WoRLD oF LAw? 30 (1969). 
44 P.H. Winfield, The Grounds of Intervention in International Law, 5 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 
149, 162 (1924). 
45 Lauterpacht, supra note 25, at 46. 
46 SeeFonteyne, supra note 22, at 206--13. 
47 See THOMAS jOSEPH LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 129 (4th 
ed. 1910). 
48 SeeT. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (4th ed. 1910), quoted 
in Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 224. 
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expressing doubts as to the legality at customary international law of 
humanitarian intervention, Roxburgh wrote in 1920, "on the other 
hand, it cannot be denied that public opinion and the attitude of the 
powers are in favor of such interventions. It may perhaps be said that 
in time the law of nations will recognize the rule that interventions in 
the interest of humanity are admissible. "49 
Whatever the position existing in customary international law 
prior to the U.N. Charter, the question arises whether humanitarian 
intervention can be maintained as an acceptable doctrine of interna-
tional law since the promulgation of that Charter in 1945. The Inter-
national Law Association, in its report submitted to the International 
Commission on Human Rights in 1970, expressed the opinion that 
"the doctrine of humanitarian intervention appears to have been so 
clearly established under customary international law that only its lim-
its and not its existence is subject to debate. "50 
Yet, we simply cannot ignore the 1970 General Assembly Declara-
tion of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, addressed to individual states, which proclaims "the duty not to 
intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in 
accordance with the Charter. "51 This proposition was affirmed in an 
earlier General Assembly Resolution, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Inde-
pendence and Sovereignty.52 Even more important in terms of the legal 
standing of the postulate against nonintervention was the judgment 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nicaragua v. United 
States,53 in which the court categorically stated that, "[t]he principle of 
non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign state to conduct 
its affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass 
49 LAssA F. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 229 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 1920). 
50 International Law Association, The International Protection of Human Rights lly General 
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERIM REPORT OF 
THE SuBCOMMITTEE 11 (1970). 
51 GA. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 338, U.N. Doc. A/8082 
(1970). 
52 See G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 107-08, U.N. Doc. 
A/6012 (1965); see al50 Charter of the Organization of the American States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 
119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, art. 18 (providing "no State or 
group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in 
the internal and external affairs of any other [s]tate .... "). 
53 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 19861.CJ. 14 (June 27). 
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against this principle are not infrequent, the court considers that it is 
part and parcel of customary international law. "54 
The ICJ decision did not end the debate, because at issue is 
whether humanitarian intervention amounts to that form of interven-
tion which goes against the political independence of the state, or 
even whether human rights are matters essentially within a state's 
domestic jurisdiction. But if the use of force in violation of the territo-
rial sovereignty of another state is always illegal, then it is immaterial 
that force is used for a benevolent purpose or that the violation of the 
territorial sovereignty is only temporary. If we assume that the U.N. 
Charter does not address the issue in an unequivocal manner, and 
that the question is still open, can one legitimately argue that a new 
rule of customary international law of humanitarian intervention now 
exists as part of the law of nations? Here the question is whether there 
has been enough state practice, coupled with opinio juris, to establish 
such a rule. 
Brownlie has categorically stated that, "it is extremely doubtful if 
... [humanitarian intervention] has survived ... the general prohibi-
tion of resort to force to be found in the United Nations Charter."55 
The argument against a post-Charter doctrine of intervention pro-
ceeds from several angles. It is claimed that the U.N. Charter ex-
pressly prohibits the use of force or threats of force by states except in 
self-defense. No article of the Charter specifically mentions humani-
tarian intervention. In fact, international legal instruments subse-
quent to the Charter, including these cited above, have emphasized 
the point of nonintervention. Those instruments that have addressed 
the question of nonintervention make no distinction between inter-
vention by a state acting unilaterally and intervention by a group of 
states acting in concert. In other words, if humanitarian intervention 
were unlawful, it would continue to be unlawful even if it were carried 
out by a group of states. During the 1963 U.N. General Assembly De-
bate on this question, the Mexican representative Gomez Robledo 
stated in the U.N. Sixth Committee: "Under Article 2 Paragraph 4 of 
the United Nations Charter, it was clear that the use of force was per-
missible in only two cases: enforcement action ordered by the Security 
54 /d. at 106 (emphasis added). 
55 IAN BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UsE OF FoRCE BY STATES 342 (1963). 
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Council under Article 42, and in conformity with Article 51, individ-
ual or collective self-defense in the event of armed attack. "56 
The argument has also been made that it is hardly possible for 
such intervention to be carried out consistently with Article 2(7) 
without going against the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of the state concerned. This is so because humanitarian inter-
vention would usually require a change of government or even seces-
sion, and thus the foreign intervention would have had to 
fundamentally influence the domestic political process and organiza-
tion ofthe stateP . 
Article 2(7) should not be confused with Article 2(4) with regard 
to the permissibility of intervention. Article 2(7) relates to the U.N. 
organization itself and precludes the organization from intervening 
in matters essentially within the jurisdiction of any state, with certain 
important exceptions regarding threats to peace, breaches of the 
peace, and acts of aggression. 58 However, Article 2 ( 4), which deals 
with interstate relations, categorically prohibits the threat or use of 
force between states except in individual or collective self-defense.59 
Therefore, it may be argued that the nonintervention principle ap-
plies even more categorically to relations between states. In other 
words, even those who support some sort of intervention would admit 
that the basic Charter obligation of nonintervention in the domestic 
affairs of a state is quite clearly more relevant to interstate relations. 
For example, in the U.N. Sixth Committee debate in 1963 just re-
ferred to, the delegate from Cyprus, Rossides, asserted that, "a very 
clear distinction should be drawn between the concept of absolute 
sovereignty of states in relation to each other and that of the limited 
sovereignty of states in relation to the United Nations."60 Rossides 
then went on to support intervention by the U.N. 
Lillich made the following statement: 
Two provisions make it very doubtful whether forcible self-
help to protect human rights is still permissible under inter-
national law. In the first place, all states by Article 2(4) re-
56 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 18th Sess., at 113, U.N. Doc. A/C6/SR806 (1963) [herein-
after U.N. Doc. A/C6/SR806]. On this view, one might find it difficult to justifY 
peacekeeping operations that do not necessarily fall under Chapter 7 enforcement action 
but sanctioned by the Security Council. 
57 See Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 255. 
58 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7. 
59 See id. arts. 2, para. 6, 51. 
60 U.N. Doc. A/C6/SR806, supra note 56, at 230. 
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nounce 'the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state' subject of 
course to the self-defense provision contained in Article 51. 
Secondly, Article 2 (7) prevents intervention by the United 
Nations 'in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state' except for the application of en-
forcement measures under Chapter [7] ,61 
17 
Such views are buttressed by the important fact that the principle of 
intervention, which had wide acceptance by the time of the creation 
of the U.N., was not expressly provided for in the Charter in the mat-
ter of interstate relations but mentioned only with respect to the U.N. 
as an organization. 
There are scholars who interpret the Article 2(4) prohibition of 
intervention as encompassing the entire range of possible interven-
tions, thus ruling out any attempt to justify other cases of interven-
tion. Giraud has argued that, "[a] restrictive interpretation has not 
been retained. The reason for [this] is that [the] interpretation does 
not correspond at all to the intentions of the drafters of the Char-
ter. "62 According to him, the phrase referring to "the territorial integ-
rity or [the] political independence" in Article 2(4) was added merely 
to satisfy small nations who wished to see the guarantee of Article 10 
of the Pact of the League of Nations restated in the Charter, and not 
to restrict the scope of the prohibition of recourse to force. 63 Sir 
Humphrey Waldock was of the same view. He argues that Article 2(4) 
prohibits any threat or use of force between independent states ex-
cept in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 or in exe-
cution of collective measures under the Charter for maintaining or 
restoring peace.64 
61 See Richard B. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL LJ. 205, 208-
09 (1969). 
62 See Giraud, L 1nterdiction du Recours a la Foree-La Theorie et la Pratique des Nations 
Unies, 67 REv. GEN. DR. INTL. PuBL. 501, 512-513 (1963), quoted in Fonteyne, supra note 
22, at 242-43. Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant provides, "the Members of the 
League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any 
such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall 
advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
COVENANT art. 10. 
63 Giraud, supra note 62, at 512-13. 
64 See Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force fly Individual States in International Law, 
81 RF.CUEIL DES COURS 455, 493 (1952), cited in Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 243. 
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Wehberg has also remarked that the final part of Article 2 ( 4), 
referring to the prohibition of the use of force "in any other manner 
incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations," should not be 
interpreted as implying any other authorized use offorce.65 Basing his 
argument on the preparatory work of the San Francisco conference 
on the U.N. Charter, he concludes that that phrase was added simply 
to guarantee that there would be no loopholes. Phillip Jessup has 
added his voice to this line of argument by concluding that: 
The landing of armed forces of one state in another state is a 
"breach of the peace" or "threat to the peace" even though 
under traditional international law it is a lawful act . . . a 
modernized law of nations should insist that the collective 
measures envisaged by Article 1 of the Charter shall supplant 
the individual measures approved by traditional interna-
tional law. 66 
Here, Jessup is disaffirming the validity of individual humanitarian 
intervention, and not necessarily that carried out under U.N.'s aus-
pices. 
To sum up the position of the anti-interventionists, there is no 
right to humanitarian intervention under international law. This has 
been made clear by U.N. General Assembly resolutions, declarations, 
and assertions, as well as by frequent condemnation of states that have 
employed humanitarian arguments to justify their actions in the do-
mestic affairs of other states. State practice, even if it does not support 
the absence of humanitarian intervention, does not in their view an-
swer the question completely. In none of the dramatic and clearly 
humanitarian interventions in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Tanzanian invasion of 
Uganda, did the international community clearly recognize the ac-
tions as legitimate, even if they were not roundly condemned. 
So, has the U.N. been acting illegally in all these years of humani-
tarian intervention? Alternatively, if such interventions through ro-
bust peacekeeping forces fit into the U.N. Charter paradigm of dis-
pute settlement, is it because they are viewed as accepted exceptions 
to the avowed principle of non-intervention, or because they are not 
really cases of "interference" as the term is used in Article 2(7) of the 
65 See Hans Wehberg, L'Interdiction du Recours ala Force, 78 REcuEIL DES CouRs 7, 70 
(1951). 
66 PHILIP jEssuP, A MoDERN LAw OF NATIONS 169-70 (1958). 
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Charter? If such interventions fall outside the ambit of Article 2(4) 
and 2 (7), what do we make of the powers of the Security Council un-
der Chapters 6 and 7 of the Charter? 
As expected, there are many other scholars and diplomats rooted 
on the side of interventionism in aid of human rights protection. It 
has been argued that Article 2(7) of the Charter has never been in-
terpreted by the General Assembly and the Security Council as pre-
venting action by the U.N. in serious cases of human rights violation. 
Recalling the discussions in 1963 of the 6th Committee of the U.N. 
General Assembly already alluded to, Rossides, the representative of 
Cyprus stated, "Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter has repeatedly 
been interpreted by the General Assembly as allowing the United Na-
tions to intervene in the internal affairs of a state in case of a flagrant 
violation of human rights or the prohibitions of the Charter. "67 A 
more general principle is that no state should, under the cover of the 
principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs, commit acts contrary 
to the peremptory rules of international law. The implication is that, 
if such acts occurred, it should be within the right of other states un-
der certain arrangements to intervene to rectifY the situation. 
Ermacora has stated categorically that, "the right to self-
determination and the protection of human rights in matters of dis-
crimination as far as 'gross violations' or 'consistent patterns of viola-
tions' are concerned are no longer essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of [s]tates."68 Reisman has also claimed that human rights 
have been placed outside the reach of the Article 2(7) ban on inter-
vention, even in cases not amounting to a threat to peace.69 This posi-
tion, of course, leaves open the question whether the nonintervention 
principle should be stricter for individual states. Fonteyne asserts that 
the U.N.'s practice in this area arguably indicates that human rights 
finally have been removed from the exclusive jurisdiction of states and 
lifted into the realm of international concern. 7o 
Fonteyne has further argued that the interpretation of Article 
2(4}, to the effect that no other use of force is authorized by the U.N. 
Charter except in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 
or under the U.N. enforcement measures under Chapter 7, rests on a 
67 U.N. Doc. A/C6/SR806, supra note 56, at 230. 
68 Felix Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic jurisdiction, 124 REcUEIL DES CouRs 375, 
436 (1968). 
69 See Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HuMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 189-91 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973). 
7o See id. at 179; see also Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 241. 
20 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:1 
view of the Charter as a closed structure of self-sufficient norms di-
vorced from the preexisting body of rules of customary international 
law.71 As for the argument that if nations wished to exclude humani-
tarian intervention from the U.N. Charter prohibition they would 
have done so explicitly, he responds that the contention raises the 
fundamental question whether the Charter must be construed as 
abolishing all preexisting norms of customary international law that it 
does not specifically and explicitly save, or whether it left unaffected 
those traditional rules which are not necessarily in contradiction with 
its own prohibitions and purposes. Fonteyne tends to favor the latter 
position for a variety of reasons, including the widely shared principle 
of domestic law that the technique of implicit repeal of preexisting 
laws must be applied only when contradictions with the new rules are 
unavoidable. 72 
Some scholars, while accepting the view that the Charter's prohi-
bition of unilateral use of force is a necessary corollary to the attain-
ment of the U.N.'s primary goal of maintaining international peace 
and security, have also taken note of the demonstrated inability or 
unwillingness of international organizations to cope with all situations 
of gross human rights violations. Consequently, they must acknowl-
edge that the absolute interpretation of the Charter's prohibition on 
the use of force by states is an unworkable and unacceptable restric-
tion upon resort to unilateral action in cases of extreme violations of 
the most fundamental human rights. They conclude that the world 
community, by its lack of adverse reaction to state intervention in all 
these circumstances, in practice condones conduct that, although 
constituting a formal breach of positive legal norms, appears "accept-
able" because of higher motives of a moral, political, or humanitarian 
nature.73 The impression given by this lack of adverse reaction to such 
specific cases is that states in fact confer on such actions the character 
of some kind of second-tier legality or sub-legality.74 
Reisman has noted that, "[a] close reading of [Article 2(4)] will 
indicate that the prohibition is not against the use of coercion per se, 
but rather the use of force for specified unlawful purposes. "75 He ar-
gues further that, "[t]he preamble and critical first Article of the 
71 See Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 243-44. 
72 See id. at 244. 
73 See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 69, at 64 
(citing Professor Thomas N. Franck). 
74 See Lillich, supra note 69, at 61-62, 118. 
75 Reisman, supra note 69, at 177. 
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Charter, framed in the awful shadow of the atrocities of the war, left 
no doubt as to the intimate nexus that the framers perceived to link 
international peace and security and the most fundamental human 
rights of all individuals. "76 -
In this respect, Reisman and McDougal have placed a great deal 
of emphasis on Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter regarding the 
universal observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as 
well as on the pledge by all member states of the organization to take 
joint and separate action in cooperation with the U.N. for the 
achievement of the purposes set out in Article 55. The two eminent 
international lawyers interpret the thrust of these Articles as trans-
forming the general commitment of the U.N. members to human 
rights into "an active obligation for joint and separate action," and 
conclude that "humanitarian intervention represents a vindication of 
internationallaw."77 Moreover, Article 51 of the Charter, dealing with 
the use of force as self-defense, has sometimes been used as a separate 
basis for humanitarian intervention with regard to missions to rescue 
nationals trapped in foreign countries. One such example is the Is-
raeli rescue of its nationals on a hijacked plane in Entebbe airport in 
Uganda in 1976.78 
Some other scholars, while not opposed to the doctrine of hu-
manitarian intervention, prefer to base its validity on the prior con-
sent of the parties involved or on a U.N. Security Council finding of a 
threat to international peace and security under Chapter 7 of the 
Charter. Thus, O'Connell has argued that, "[s]hort of giving unlim-
ited scope to the concept of threat to the peace, there is no legal basis 
for [U.N.] intervention without the parties' consent. "79 In other 
words, she sees only two bases of authority for U.N. intervention in 
civil wars: (1) the prior consent of the parties to the conflict; or (2) a 
finding of a threat to international peace and security by the Security 
Council. Using these two parameters to discuss the Iraqi and YUgoslav 
crises in 1990 and 1991, she concludes that the U.N. "has not aban-
doned the Charter prohibition on intervention in civil war. "80 
76 !d. at 171. 
77 McDougal & Reisman, Response, 3 INT'L LAwvER 434, 444 ( 1960). 
78 However, the extent to which the right to self-defense includes a right of protection 
of nationals abroad has been the subject of acute controversy in international law because 
it is difficult to equate protection of nationals abroad with the preservation of the state 
itself. 
79 Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on U.N. Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. LJ. 
903,911 (1992). 
so See id. at 903-04. 
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O'Connell recalls that as the fight to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi 
occupation ended, Iraqi Kurds began a rebellion against the Iraqi 
government and requested that the U.N.-sanctioned allied coalition 
liberate them. Questions about the legality of such intervention were 
raised. Despite pressure from France to sanction intervention, the 
Security Council granted only humanitarian aid and refused any aid 
that might change the political status quo. This decision was made 
regardless of the fact that in Security Council Resolution 688 the 
Council found that the Iraqi repression of the Kurds was a violation of 
international peace and security.81 O'Connell notes that the U.N. ac-
tion did not amount to illegal interference as they did not help the 
Kurds secede or rearrange Iraq's government. 
But it is a fact that allied forces claiming the authority of Resolu-
tion 688 and the earlier Resolution 678, distributed food to the refu-
gees, set up camps for them, and defended them against Iraqi attack 
by creating a protective zone and excluding Iraqi troops from the 
Kurdish region. It was not argued that they should help the Kurds win 
their fight; they were there only to grant humanitarian aid to the re-
treating Kurds. According to O'Connell, the allied or coalition forces 
were even eager to remove their troops from this humanitarian assis-
tance to the Kurds, urging the U.N. to take over the task instead. U.N. 
peacekeeping troops did not assume this task until Iraq gave its con-
sent in june, 1991.82 
However, one would question the voluntary nature of the consent 
given to this deployment by Iraq, which then stood as a defeated na-
tion. Was it a real case of consent, or simply the imposition of the 
U.N. deployment as a condition for allied withdrawal? How realistic is 
O'Connell's insistence on consent of the parties as a condition for 
entry? Are we referring to the consent of all the parties, or only of the 
government, which is invariably the party prosecuting the war against 
dissidents or would-be secessionists? The Kurds in Iraq would have 
been most willing to grant their consent to the occupation by the al-
lied forces. 
With regard to the former YUgoslavia, O'Connell recounts the 
origins of the crisis and notes that it was when the parties to the 
conflict-mainly Milosevic's Federal Yugoslavia acting for the Serb 
population and Tudjman's Croatia-appeared amenable to U.N. in-
81 See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 31-32, U.N. Doc. S/Res/688 
(1991). 
82 See O'Connell, supra note 79, at 909. 
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volvement that the U.N. began to consider proposals for a peacekeep-
ing force in that region. Could force have been legitimately used to 
enter the fugoslav crisis at that point? O'Connell argues that the Se-
curity Council would have had to establish the existence of a threat to 
international peace and security before the U.N. or its surrogates 
could intervene militarily. Yet, she adds, at least in the initial stages no 
such threat could be found; "no outside states appear[ed] to be 
threatened by war or on the verge of intervening. "83 Thus, the only 
remaining avenue was to insist on the consent of the parties as a con-
dition for entry. Indeed, on November 27, 1991, such consent was 
given and the Security Council promptly adopted a resolution author-
izing a 10,000-person force.84 It should be pointed out, however, that 
after the recognition of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina by 
Germany and other European countries, any reference to a merely 
internal crisis became inappropriate. Military assistance by Milosevic's 
Yugoslavia to the Serb nationalists in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and Croatian counter attacks across the border in Bihac (northwest-
ern Bosnia) and in territories occupied by the Bosnian Serbs, clearly 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. U.N. military 
presence from that point onward could be justified even in terms of 
O'Connell's criteria, provided a relevant Security Council Resolution 
was in place. 
At any rate, O'Connell admits that intervention to distribute hu-
manitarian aid would not fall foul of her clear stand against humani-
tarian intervention without consent. "Distribution of humanitarian 
aid, even against the wishes of a government in effective control, is 
not unlawful intervention according to the International Court of Jus-
tice. "85 O'Connell's objections seem to deal with the use of force by 
the U.N. to prevent the violation of human rights in general, includ-
ing those that are internationally protected.86 She seems to have no 
problems with humanitarian aid delivered through the use of force. 
But why should one, in principle, accept military nonconsensual in-
tervention for the distribution of food, water, shelter, and other hu-
83 !d. at 910. 
84 Paul Lewis, U.S. Offering to Send Force to Yugvslavia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1991, at Al; 
seealfoS.C. Res. 721, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3018th mtg. at44, U.N. Doc. S/23280 (1991). 
85 O'Connell, supra note 79, at 906. O'Connell cites the ICJ decision in Nicaragua v. 
United States, in which the court wrote: "There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly 
humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political 
affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other 
way contrary to international law." !d. quoting Nicaragua. v. U.S., 1986 I.CJ. at 14. 
86 See O'Connell, supra note 79, at 904. 
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manitarian aid, but not for such protection against genocide, mass 
slaughter, or mass torture? Is the "right" to food, water, and shelter 
any more valuable than the right to life, or freedom from torture, 
viewed by some national courts as part of jus cogens?87 Of what use is 
food, water, or shelter to a people who are about to be exterminated 
or tortured to death? 
When the ICJ in the Nicaragua case admitted the permissibility of 
"strictly humanitarian aid" as an exception to unlawful interventions, 
were the justices oblivious to the allegedly blanket prohibition of Arti-
cle 2 ( 7) of the U.N. Charter? Or were they consciously carving out an 
exception to Article 2(7) based on other provisions of the Charter, 
such as Chapter 7 measures or the human rights provisions; or were 
they basing this exception on rules of customary international law 
that might have survived the adoption of the Charter? At any rate, it 
seems clear that the Nicaragua case was concerned with claims of uni-
lateral humanitarian intervention by one state, the United States, 
rather than intervention by U.N. forces carried out under Chapters 6 
or 7 of the U.N. Charter. The Charter's enforcement measures under 
Chapter 7 certainly remain one basis for acceptable military interven-
tion to aid certain internationally protected human rights, and not 
simply for humanitarian aid. One might be able to construct a 
justification without offending O'Connell's objection to giving unlim-
ited scope to the concept of threat to the peace. 
Indeed, Jost Delbruck has questioned the need to confine a 
threat to international peace and security to situations involving "the 
threat of using military force in the international, transborder rela-
tions of states,"88 i.e., to the case of military forces leaving their na-
tional borders or launching missiles into other countries on a mission 
of aggression, such as Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Delbruck looks 
to the recent practice of the Security Council to suggest that the lan-
guage of Article 39 of the Charter could be interpreted more broadly 
to cover "state actions other than military threats to international 
peace,"89 and that such actions could be incompatible with "an under-
standing of peace as an [international] legal order. ''90 Thus, as far 
back as 1966, the Security Council, in its Chapter 7 condemnations 
and decisions on the racist regime of Ian Smith in then Southern 
87 See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). 
88 Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the 
United Nations, 67 IND. LJ. 887,899 (1992) (emphasis added). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 900. 
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Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), referred to the acts of that regime as "a 
threat to international peace."91 In the same vein, the Security Coun-
cil in 1968 and 1977 consistently described the apartheid system of 
South Africa as a "threat to international peace. "92 Similarly, the Secu-
rity Council decried the persecution of the Kurds by Saddam 
Hussein's regime in 1991.93 In none of these three situations was the 
Security Council dealing with the departure of military forces of the 
condemned state crossing its borders to ravage its neighbors or other 
states. 
If the Security Council was correct in its description of these 
situations, their attitude might be explained in at least three ways. 
First, the easiest would be to assert that genocide and massive human 
rights violations of similar dimensions, even if not immediately consti-
tuting a violation of international peace and security, could poten-
tially become a threat to such peace because neighboring and other 
states having the persecuted ethnic or racial group as part of their 
population would eventually "gear up" and intervene to protect their 
"kith and kin." Second, human rights repression that leads to a huge 
exodus of refugees to neighboring states could lead to serious ten-
sions among the neighbors as the receiving countries begin to chafe 
under the pressure of large numbers of displaced persons and there-
fore attempt to force some of them back into their country of emigra-
tion. This situation could be characterized as a threat to international 
peace and security.94 Third, as Delbruck suggests, we may assume that 
as the world community becomes increasingly "sensitized by such 
events" or, better yet, traumatized by such massive violations of human 
rights, some nations would feel justified in confronting the perpetra-
tors and the situation would sooner or later escalate into an interna-
tional military conflict.95 
We would conclude that humanitarian intervention should be 
accepted in principle, but limited to situations where there is a threat 
to peace as broadly conceived, or where there is brutal suppression of 
the most fundamental types of human rights such as the right to life 
9' S.C. Res 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc S/7610 (1966). 
92 S.C. Res. 181, U.N. SCOR, 18th Sess., 1041st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc S/5386 (1963); see 
also S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., 2046th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc S/12470 (1977). 
9! SeeS. C. Res 688, supra note 81, at 31-32. 
94 See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Introduction and Concluding Reflection, in ENFORCING RE-
STRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 363-64 (Lori Fisler Dam-
rosch ed., 1993). 
95 Delbruck, supra note 88, at 900. 
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or freedom from torture. 96 Further, it seems preferable to recognize a 
legal norm affirming that in certain extreme situations, where neither 
the U.N. nor the competent regional organizations can or wants to 
assume its responsibilities, a group of states may be temporarily re-
lieved of their obligation of restraint in Article 2 ( 4) so as to undertake 
the enforcement of international human rights.97 It seems clear that 
the U.N. Charter, particularly in its Preamble and Article 1 ( 3), de-
mands a certain amount of justice and respect for the human person. 
From this it is reasonable to reject the allotment of an absolute value 
to the mere avoidance of armed conflict, and to uphold the convic-
tion that certain extreme situations justify and require temporary de-
parture from a nonviolent world in order to achieve a more perma-
nent structure of justice. 
With regard to the fear that the sanctioning of humanitarian in-
tervention would lead to frequent abuse and misuse for other pur-
poses or motives, it would seem wrong to fail to recognize an inher-
ently just principle merely because of the possibility that others might 
invoke it for non-genuine purposes. While one can point to examples 
of humanitarian intervention where there was a remarkable lack of 
strong global condemnation in view of the odious brutality of the 
overthrown regimes, it would seem more effective to state a restricted 
norm accepting the legality of humanitarian intervention in well-
defined specific situations than to insist on an approach in which the 
prospective humanitarian interventionists know that, regardless of 
their motives and the prevailing circumstances, they breached inter-
national law. In that event, their only consolation and hope is that the 
world community will remain silent on their infractions or admire 
them in secret.98 But this would be an inadequate recognition of the 
sacrifices that individuals and states often make for the protection of 
defenseless human beings in distant lands who have no other rela-
tionship with the defenders except their common bond of humanity. 
III. THE PROBLEM WITH UNILATERAL AND REGIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Some real or claimed humanitarian interventions over the past 
twenty years have indeed promoted fresh and wider perspectives on 
the doctrine: ( 1) the plight of the Kurds of Iraq in the wake of the 
96 See Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 269-70. 
97 See Reisman, supra note 69, at 178. 
98 See Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 249. 
2002] Humanitarian Interoention and Peacekeeping 27 
Iraqi-Kuwait crisis in the early 1990s; (2) the crisis in Croatia and Bos-
nia in the former fugoslavia in the early 1990s; (3) the U.S. invasions 
of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989; and (4) the West Mrican 
regional intervention in the carnage of Liberia from 1989 to 1996. 
It seems clear that attitudes to humanitarian intervention be-
come more negative when such actions are taken, not by U.N. peace-
keepers or even by a group of states within a regional organization, 
but essentially by one state in the affairs of its neighbors. Where there 
has been long-standing and large-scale atrocities widely publicized on 
a global basis, an individual intervening state might escape condem-
nation or even win muted approval. Clear examples are the Tanzanian 
invasion of Uganda to oust Idi Amin in 1979, and the 1979 Vietnam-
ese invasion of Kampuchea to oust the Khmer Rouge. But while the 
legal validity of such interventions might have remained an open 
question, their essentially humanitarian drive and motivation were 
beyond any serious doubt. 
On the other hand, we encounter situations in which the motiva-
tions and justifications for intervention, as declared by the invading 
state itself, are multiple and equivocal and there is no statement as to 
which of the announced justifications is most significant. However, 
since the state or states concerned cite humanitarian concerns as one 
of their justifications for the intervention, it may be appropriate to 
include such cases in a general discussion of the doctrine and eventu-
ally to evaluate the strength of the claims made. This general discus-
sion will take us outside our primary focus of U.N. peacekeeping op-
erations and embrace the consideration of three well-known cases of 
claimed humanitarian intervention over the past twenty-five years-
the 1983 intervention in Grenada by the United States and some mem-
bers of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean states (OECS); the 
U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989; and the 1990 intervention in 
Liberia by ECOMOG, the military wing of the Economic Community 
of West Mrican States. 
A. Grenada 
The small Caribbean island of Grenada, 120 square miles in size, 
was invaded in October, 1983 by a U.S.-led force of some 8000 U.S. 
troops and 300 soldiers from seven Caribbean countries. Five of these 
Caribbean states were members of the subregional grouping, the 
OECS, to which Grenada also belonged. The intervention, named 
"Operation Urgent Fury," started in the capital city of St. George's on 
October 25, 1983, and had secured all of its military objectives and 
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defeated the local Grenadian army, the People's Revolutionary Army, 
by October 28th. By December 15, 1983, all U.S. combat forces had 
been withdrawn. "Fury" left in its wake at least ninety-five people 
dead, including more than thirty civilians, and about 430 wounded.99 
In a statement on the Grenada events made before the U.S. 
House Committee on Foreign Mfairs on November 2, 1983, Kenneth 
Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, offered two main reasons for the 
military intervention: (1) rescuing foreign and U.S. nationals before 
actual violence occurred; and (2) cooperating in the restoration of 
order. "This collective action was brought about by ten days of ex-
traordinary events that had led to brutality and instability without 
precedent in the English-speaking Caribbean. "100 
The fact that members of the OECS participated in this essen-
tially U.S. operation was cited as a case of "collective self-defense" un-
der Article 8 of the OECS Treaty and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
The irony in this argument lay in the fact that Article 8 specifically 
dealt with collective defense and the preservation of peace and secu-
rity against external aggression. As Joyner has pointed out regarding 
the rather forced interpretation of this OECS Article, "the United 
States is not a party to the [OECS] Treaty and therefore legally lies 
outside the ambit of its concerns."1°1 Moreover, in this particular case, 
"no external aggressor existed: Grenada, the state in question, was a 
treaty member ... there is, in short, no provision for military action 
in instances other than those involving 'external aggression, including 
mercenary aggression.' "102 
Unlike the U.S. invasion of Panama six years later, the reasons 
given by Dam in his presentation before the U.S. House Committee 
did not mention the establishment of democracy as one of the inva-
sion's objectives. "Our objectives," Dam stated, "do not encompass the 
imposition on the Grenadians of any particular form of government. 
They will determine their institutions freely for themselves."103 None-
theless, the two stated reasons still call for some examination in order 
99 See generally Terry Nardin & Kathleen D. Pritchard, Case 502: Ethics and Intervention: 
The United States in Grenada, 1983, in GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: PEw CASE STUDIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 12 (1990). 
100 Dep. Sec. of State Kenneth W. Dam, Statement on Grenada before the House 
Committee on Foreign Mfairs (Oct. 25, 1983), quoted in Marian Nash Leich, Rescue opera-
tion iJy Armed Forces-Grenada, 78 AM.J. INT'L L. 200, 200 (1984). 
101 Christopher C. Joyner, Reflection on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM.J. INT'L L. 131, 
131 (1984). 
102 !d. 
103 Dam, supra note 100, at 204. 
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to establish whether Operation Urgent Fury was a legitimate episode 
in humanitarian intexvention. 
In principle, rescuing nationals from harm in a foreign country 
could qualify as humanitarian intervention and, more tenuously, as an 
exercise in national self-defense. Furthermore, intervention to put an 
end to brutality within the indigenous population of a foreign land 
and to restore public order among them has historically offered the 
best examples of humanitarian intervention. However, such claims 
have to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis in order to separate reality 
from pretext. Hence a brief factual background to the Grenada crisis 
is called for.104 
Maurice Bishop, the popular leader of the leftist New Jewel 
Movement (NJM) in Grenada, seized power on March 13, 1979 and 
became Prime Minister and head of the People's Revolutionary Gov-
ernment (PRG). The Bishop team put into place a socialist-type socio-
economic program, but a split soon developed within the team. One 
faction, led by the Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, apparently 
felt that Bishop was not being radical enough and that he was "mov-
ing too slowly to consolidate a 'Leninist' restructuring of Grenadian 
society. "105 On September 25, 1983, Bishop was forced by the ruling 
party to share his leadership of the NJM, and on October 12th Coard 
attempted to force him out as Prime Minister. This marked the be-
ginning of the collapse of governmental institutions, a breakdown in 
public order, and widespread brutality. Bishop was taken into custody 
and put under house arrest. A crowd of supporters, fired upon by 
troops, later succeeded in freeing him from arrest. Wishing to halt 
further violence, he surrendered to the military and was promptly 
executed. Several cabinet ministers and union leaders met the same 
fate. In the wake of these and other murders, the People's Revolu-
tionary Army announced the dissolution of the government and the 
formation of a sixteen-member ruling military council led by General 
Hudson Austin. A "shoot-on-sight" curfew was imposed and scheduled 
to remain in effect until October 24, 1983. The U.S. invasion began 
the following day. 
One group of foreign nationals prominently featured in the "res-
cue justification" of the intervention consisted of 354 American medi-
cal student residents at the True Blue and Grand Anse campuses of 
104 Cf Nardin & Pritchard, supra note 99. See generally Dam, supra note 100, at 204. 
10s Leich, supra note 100, at 200. 
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St. George's Medical School.106 According to the Pew Case Study ac-
count of the intervention, the students never felt they were in danger 
in the days prior to the invasion. At a meeting of the students held on 
October 23, 1983, only ten percent expressed a desire to leave.I07 The 
Chancellor and the Vice Chancellor of the medical school did not 
believe the students were in danger and refused to make a public 
statement to the contrary. On October 24th, as four charter planes 
left St. George's airport, the students had the opportunity to depart 
the island if they wished. Thus, there was an unresolved and serious 
doubt concerning the extent to which U.S. citizens were endangered 
on the eve of the invasion. However, there remained the justification 
relating to the spread of brutalities and the breakdown of public or-
der, the victims of which were predominantly the people of Grenada 
themselves. Leaving aside the matter of rescuing Americans and other 
foreign nationals, would the protection of Granadians have featured 
as a significant factor in the decision to invade? 
Given the size, location, population, and the nature of its econ-
omy, Grenada, prior to the emergence of Maurice Bishop, had tradi-
tionally been considered "too insignificant to command the attention 
of senior government officials in Washington. "lOS Grenada was not 
Panama. Soon after Bishop and his leftist NJM came to power, Gre-
nada began to attract attention, particularly after its government 
voted with Cuba against the United States on a U.N. General Assem-
bly Resolution on Mghanistan. The Carter Administration's policy was 
essentially to distance itself from Grenada. However, relations between 
the two countries worsened during the Reagan Administration. Apart 
from Grenada's record of human rights violations, U.S. hostility to-
wards her was exacerbated by Bishop's growing links with Castro's 
Cuba and the pitch of his anti-American rhetoric. According to one 
account, Bishop once publicly referred to President Reagan as a "fas-
cist."109 The U.S. President, in turn, did not mince his words in mani-
festing his disgust with Grenada. In February, 1982, while announcing 
the creation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative-a regime of preferen-
tial tariff treatment of Caribbean exports produced with U.S. materi-
als-President Reagan rejected Grenada's participation in the pro-
gram and referred to the "tightening grip of the totalitarian left" in 
106 It was estimated that there were 130 on the True Blue campus, and 224 at the 
Grand Anse end. &e Nardin & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 11-12. 
107 &eid. at 7. 
108 ld. at 1. 
109 Id. at 2. 
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the Caribbean. On a subsequent occasion, he attacked Grenada as 
bearing "the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will 
attempt to spread the virus among its neighbors. "11° Finally, on March 
23, 1983, while presenting his "Star Wars" plan to the American peo-
ple in a nationwide address, President Reagan showed aerial recon-
naissance photographs of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada as evidence 
of the building of a "red triangle. "111 
If President Reagan wished to disentangle Grenada from this Car-
ibbean "red triangle," and to stop the spreading "communist virus" in 
its tracks, the disturbances in that country would have provided him 
with a great excuse to launch an invasion. It is most unlikely that 
President Reagan was motivated to act out of chagrin for the execu-
tion of Bishop and his Marxist-Leninist ministers. It should be re-
called that Bishop himself had written several letters to President 
Reagan requesting more normal diplomatic relations. His letters went 
unanswered. After President Reagan's "Star Wars" broadcast on March 
23, 1983, Bishop, sensing an impending invasion, flew to Washington 
to seek an audience with President Reagan. He did not succeed in this 
effort, and merely ended up with a forty-minute meeting with the U.S. 
National Security Advisor and the Deputy Secretary of State.ll2 
President Reagan, who once described the Soviet Union as "the 
Evil Empire," seemed obsessed with the threat of international com-
munism. His foreign policy led to what became known as the "Reagan 
doctrine," which he himselflater extolled in a speech at the National 
Defense University on October 25, 1988: 
Around the world in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and 
yes, in Central America, the United States stands today with 
those who would fight for freedom. We stand with ordinary 
people who have had the courage to take up arms against 
Communist tyranny. This stand is at the core of what some 
have called the Reagan Doctrine.m 
Indeed, in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and 
Nicaragua, where the United States under the Reagan Administration 
did not directly intervene in its global ideological war, it provided as-
sistance, including weapons, to its "freedom fighters." In the case of 
110 ld. at 3. 
lll Nardin & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 3. 
112 /d. 
m Quoted in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 24, at 1175. 
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Grenada, it was easier to do an ideological battle in the form of direct 
military intervention. 
The Reagan Doctrine had no more credence in international law 
than the Brezhnev Doctrine, which purported to lend a hollow ideo-
logical justification to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the 
summer of 1968.114 Yet, it was probably the Reagan Doctrine, and not 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, that provided the 
justification for the American intervention in Grenada. A report sub-
mitted in 1984 by a special committee of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Section on International Law and Practice reached the conclu-
sion that "the military action initiated October 25th rests upon an 
unsteady legal foundation. "115 
B. Panama 
On December 20, 1989, under the Bush Administration, the 
United States invaded Panama. General Manuel Noriega, then de facto 
leader of Panama and "Commandante" of the country's armed forces, 
had been a good ally of the United States under both the Reagan and 
Bush administrations, but became an enemy after U.S. officials tagged 
him with involvement in drug trafficking into the United States and 
all forms of political malfeasance. Noriega had attempted to rig the 
May, 1989 elections of the national assembly and the presidency. This 
was unsuccessful, as his candidate lost to the opposition leader, Gui-
llermo Endarra. Noriega refused to accept the results, and continued 
to maintain himself and his henchmen in power by force of arms. 
Apparently, the United States initially attempted to negotiate 
Noriega's voluntary surrender of power. When this and economic 
sanctions failed, President Bush launched a military offensive-"Op-
114 The doctrine was as follows: 
[A] particular socialist state, staying in a system of other states composing the 
socialist community, cannot be free from the common interests of that com-
munity. The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the 
interests of that community. The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot 
be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the world revolution-
ary movement. ... Discharging their inter-nationalist duty toward the frater-
nal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist gains, the 
USSR and other socialist states had to act decisively . . . against the anti-
socialist forces in Czechoslovakia. 
ld. at 1170. 
115 Gordon et al., International Law and the United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 
INT'L LAW 339,339 (1984). 
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eration Just Cause"-comprising of approximately 26,000 military 
personnel to oust Noriega from power. 
Reporting the invasion to the U.S. Congress the next day, Bush 
stated that he ordered the invasion "to protect American lives, to de-
fend democracy in Panama, to apprehend Noriega and bring him to 
trial on the drug-related charges for which he was indicted in 1988, 
and to ensure the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties. "116 U.S. 
forces met some resistance in the early hours of the invasion, but 
within four days, Noriega's forces had been routed, and on January 3, 
1990, he had turned himself in to U.S. military authorities in Panama. 
He was then embarked upon a plane en route to Homestead Air 
Force Base in Florida to face trial for drug trafficking.ll7 
In the above-mentioned report to Congress, Bush only made a 
general mention of a climate of aggression that had "place[d] Ameri-
can lives and interests in peril, "118 specifically referring only to the kill-
ing of one U.S. Marine officer by the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) 
personnel, the beating and detention of a U.S. Naval officer, and 
threats to the officer's wife. No incidents were alleged in the report 
regarding massacres carried out by Noriega's supporters against fel-
low Panamanians. There was certainly no mention of carnage occur-
ring in Panama involving American and Panamanian lives. In fact, 
within that short three-to-four day period of the U.S. invasion, there 
had been at least 400 Panamanian deaths in comparison to only 
twenty-three U.S. fatalities.119 
Operation Just Cause led to lively debate among international 
law scholars in the United States, including sharp exchanges in the 
pages of the American Journal of International Law and the Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law. Abraham Sofaer, then Legal Advisor to 
the State Department, argued that the Panama operation was both 
necessary and proportionate under international law; it was a 
justifiable use of force aimed at "restor[ing] the legitimate, demo-
cratic government selected by the people of Panama," and that the 
116 President George Bush, Report to Congress and Hon. Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of 
the House of Representatives (Dec. 21, 1989), in COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 1299 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter President's Letter]. 
117 For a detailed account of these events and the immunity and jurisdictional issues, 
see this Journal, Adam I. Hasson, Note, Extraterritorial jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity on 
Trial: Noriega, Milosevic, and Pinochet-Trends in Political Accountability and Transnational 
Criminal Law, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV 125, 127 (2000). 
118 President's Letter, supra note 116. 
119 See id. at 1288. 
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threat or use of force is not inherently wrong.I2° Sofaer seemed to 
place the use of force to restore democracy under the rubric of hu-
manitarian intervention. 
Anthony D'Amato, another vibrant defender of the Panama inva-
sion, focused on the human rights gains of the intervention to justify 
its validity under international law. He was enthused about "the hu-
man rights of Panamanian citizens to be free from oppression by a 
gang of ruling thugs. "121 He dismissed concerns about the unwar-
ranted interference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Panama as "views ... conditioned by a statist concept of international 
law. "122 The adherents of such views appeared incapable of "see [ing] 
through the abstraction that we call the 'state' to the reality of human 
beings struggling to achieve basic freedoms. "123 
According to D'Amato, if Article 18 of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) Charter could be cited for the proposition 
that no trans-boundary military intervention is permissible,124 the 
OAS Charter is arguably a self-interested expression of the Latin 
American countries which sought to form a non-intervention cartel so 
that each would have free reign in their own nation. If human rights 
were to be taken seriously, one could not give much weight to the 
conspiracies among ruling elites that did not represent the views of 
their populations. Non-intervention treaties are not real rules of in-
ternational law but quasi-rules invented by ruling elites to insulate 
their domestic control.125 D'Amato viewed behavior such as the U.S. 
invasion of Panama and Grenada as milestones in the development of 
a non-statist concept of international law that would change previous 
nonintervention formulas such as Article 18 of the OAS Charter.126 
The real world, according to him, was changing faster than the statist 
paradigms of scholars, and tyranny was giving way to popular sover-
eignty. The invasions of Panama and Grenada had contributed to this 
momentum and might act as catalysts in this global revolution. Ruling 
elites who enjoy tyrannical control and regard themselves as secure 
from internal uprising can no longer regard themselves as insulated 
120 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'LL. 281,290 (1991). 
121 Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. 
J. lNT'L L. 516,516 (1990). 
122 !d. 
123 !d. 
124 See id. at 516-18. 
125 !d. at 522-23. 
126 See D'Amato, supra note 121, at 516-17. 
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from foreign humanitarian intervention.127 Human rights law de-
mands intervention against tyranny, and such intervention is legally 
justified and morally required.l28 But who might intervene in such 
situations? Multilateral or regional intervention, according to 
D'Amato, were preferable candidates. However, in his opinion, any 
nation with the will and resources may intervene to protect the popu-
lation of another nation against tyranny.129 
Just as Operation Just Cause had its supporters within interna-
tional law circles in the United States, the military action triggered 
even more virulent opposition from other well-known scholars. Louis 
Henkin, reacting to Sofaer's defense of the invasion, debunked the 
suggestion that "a small exception for humanitarian intervention" in 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter justified an invasion when few U.S. 
citizens were in fact threatened, especially when the nationals could 
have been rescued or protected without armed invasion: ''There is no 
basis in law for such radical exceptions to Article 2 ( 4)," declared 
Henkin)30 Sofaer's views "eviscerates Art. 2(4) ," and would unduly 
expand humanitarian intervention to permit any state to invade an-
other "to impose the invading state's view and version of democ-
racy. "131 Further, Sofaer's position that the threat or use of force was 
not inherently wrong was "surely not international law."132 Henkin 
concludes that the United States "did not have even a color of 
justification" for the invasion of Panama.m 
Tom Farer, equally strident in this criticism of the invasion as a 
case of humanitarian intervention, admits that operations to rescue a 
state's nationals might be permissible under internationallaw.134 The 
United States and some other states have consistently construed the 
U.N. Charter to allow rescue expeditions, and the international 
community generally has an expectation that those states that can will 
continue to invoke such a right. In addition, the U.N. has not 
specifically repudiated such a claim. Given the right of citizens over-
seas to state protection, a state's claim of rescue rights can be assimi-
127 See id. at 524. 
128 See id. at 519. 
129 !d. 
uo Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 
COLUM.j. 1'RANSNAT'L L. 293,307 (1991). 
131 Id. at309. 
U2 ld. at 310. 
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lated into the right of self-defense. Thus, the use of force to rescue 
nationals cannot be persuasively described as contrary to interna-
tional law if the mission complies with the principles of proportional-
ity and necessity, and is not tainted with ulterior motives. However, 
claimed Farer, President Bush would have had difficulty demonstrat-
ing that the Panamanian invasion met the limiting conditions. 
Secondly, if the justification for the invasion was viewed in terms 
of the imperatives of a democratic system of government, the Bush 
Administration would need to argue that one state can force a change 
in the political machinery of another state for other reasons besides 
the protection of their own sovereignty-a theory which has received 
widespread international hostility.l35 Despite the fact that some coun-
tries withhold recognition of certain governments for ideological rea-
sons, it is seldom argued by those refusing recognition that the new 
government did not have the protection that international law pro-
vides all other states. 
Farer concludes that if the United States rested its justification 
for the invasion on any normative paradigm, it was not one that can 
be derived from the Charter.l36 He then takes a final swipe at 
D'Amato, arguing that any attempt at advocating a state's right of in-
tervention in any other state in order to remove a government forced 
to maintain itself through the intimidation of the majority, might 
make such an advocate appear unwise. On the day Noriega was being 
flown to Florida under U.S. arrest, President Bush declared that he 
had accomplished all four objectives of his military intervention in 
Panama: "[T] o safeguard the lives of American citizens, to help re-
store democracy, to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Trea-
ties, and to bring General Manuel Noriega to justice. "137 However, as 
always, we must be able to distinguish between true objectives or rea-
sons for actions, and pretextual aims or rationalizations. 
Operation Just Cause had little to do with humanitarian interven-
tion. It is a situation in which the claim of humanitarian intervention 
rings hollow, and actually does a disservice to the serious-minded 
struggle to establish the doctrine as a valid principle of international 
law. While the immorality of foreign state action may outweigh the 
interests protected by the non-intervention norm of international law, 
135 See id. at 509-10. 
136 See id. at 514. 
137 Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under International 
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it is certainly relevant in a claim of humanitarian intervention to es-
tablish the scale of alleged victims.138 This raises the matter of propor-
tion of the means and methods used by the intervening state to deal 
with the situation at hand. In the case of Panama, was it the number 
of American citizens and/ or Panamanian nationals who were killed or 
maimed that turned the invasion into one of humanitarian interven-
tion? 
Bush listed the restoration of democracy among the objectives of 
his triumphant invasion of Panama. While it appeared that Noriega's 
foe, Endarra, was winning the vote count in the May, 1989 elections, 
the count was actually never completed. Thus, it was more accurate to 
refer to the ensuing problem as the disruption of the electoral proc-
ess. At any rate, the "restoration" of democracy in Panama certainly 
does not require the same human rights protection as the push to as-
sure humanitarian assistance to the sick and famished as in Somalia in 
1992-1995 and Bosnia in 1994-1995, or the desperate incursions to 
curtail sustained massacres in Liberia in the late 1980s and Sierra Le-
one in the mid-1990s. 
The "right to democratic governance" embraced by Franck and 
Rumage is still emerging. The level of moral sensitivity of the interna-
tional community as a whole to such a right did not appear to have 
reached a stage in 1989-1990 whereby military intervention to en-
force the right could be justified in terms of human rights protection. 
The right to democratic governance, even when it has finally emerged 
and become stabilized, would still need to pay allegiance to the more 
basic norms of non-intervention and self-determination. Democratic 
governance is a subset of self-determination; and self-determination 
as enshrined in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter seems virtually in-
separable from the precept of non-intervention in Article 2(4). This 
explains Rumage's description of the norms of non-intervention and 
self-determination as "the literal DNA of the democratic entitlement. 
To proclaim their destruction is as futile as trying to kill one's ances-
tors. "139 
Similar to the intervention in Grenada, Operation just Cause was 
not a valid case of humanitarian intervention. Ved Nanda was correct 
when he declared that the intervention in Panama was dictated by 
ISS See Sarah A. Rumage, Panama and the Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in U.S. F(ff-
eign Policy: Neither Legal N(ff M(ffa~ Neither just N(ff Right, 10 Aluz.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 34 
(1993). 
139 /d. at 70. 
38 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:1 
U.S. political considerations, in disregard of the international law 
norms on the use of force in international relations.140 Among the 
overriding U.S.'s concerns were: (1) uncertainties over the fate of the 
Panama Canal, as the Carter-negotiated treaties came closer to im-
plementation; (2) the role of Panama in the U.S.-Central American 
drug trafficking; and (3) the intransigence of General Manuel 
Noriega. 
C. Liberia 
Humanitarian intervention in Liberia was undertaken by a re-
gional organization, ECOMOG, in contrast to those carried out by 
U.N. peace forces, such as those in the former fugoslavia, during the 
earlier phase of the crisis, or by individual states as in the case of the 
United States in Panama. While the U.N. Charter entrusted the pri-
mary responsibility for maintaining peace and security to the U.N. 
Security Council in Chapters 6 and 7, it also recognized in Chapter 8 
the potential contribution of "regional arrangements or agencies" 
towards the maintenance of peace and security in their respective 
corners of the world. The role of the Economic Community of West 
Mrican States (ECOWAS) and its military wing, ECOMOG, in re-
gional peacekeeping should be viewed from this broad perspective of 
the hopes and aspirations of the framers of the U.N. Charter. 
The treaty establishing ECOWAS was signed by fifteen West Mri-
can countries on May 25, 1975, and formally ratified by all signatories 
by June 19th. However, it was not until 1977 that ECOWAS was un-
derway. The ECOWAS Fund [Fund]-an affiliate agency for coopera-
tion and development-was later set up to help finance community 
projects in member states. In particular, the Fund was created to help 
less developed member states and to compensate states that suffered 
as a result of trade liberalization. Hence, our focusing on the military 
incarnation of ECOWAS, the "ECOWAS Monitoring Group," better 
known as ECOMOG. In May, 1978, at its Lagos Summit, ECOWAS 
ratified a non-aggression protocol. Up to that point, it was the most 
political step adopted by the member states in an organization that 
had been founded essentially to promote tariff elimination, aligned 
currencies, and the free movement of persons. 
ECOMOG faced its first, and most difficult, test with the Liberian 
Civil War from 1989 to 1996. In December, 1989, Charles Taylor, 
140 See Nanda, supra note 137, at 502. 
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leader of the National Patriotic front of Liberia (NPFL), and later 
President of Liberia, instigated a civil war to remove Samuel Doe as 
the dictatorial Liberian President. By July, 1990, all civil authority 
within Liberia had broken down. In August, 1990, members of ECO-
MOG, led by Nigeria, attempted to impose a cease-fire through mili-
tary intervention. These operations were undertaken after the U.N. 
and the United States declined to intervene in the war.14I 
Not all ECOWAS member states supported the intervention in 
Liberia. In fact, the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso supplied troops and 
arms to Taylor and the NPFL. While President Doe and Prince John-
son supported the intervention, Taylor vehemently opposed any for-
eign action and declared war against ECOMOG. After Johnson's 
forces killed Doe, he and the ECOMOG forces began to drive the 
NPFL from Monrovia. ECOMOG attempts at negotiating peace re-
sulted in reneged promises and unreasonable demands from Taylor. 
As a result, ECOWAS established a government in Monrovia that 
was recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). How-
ever, Taylor, with the support of his NPFL forces, established a de facto 
government controlling most of the country. The remains of Doe's 
forces regrouped to form the United Liberation Movement 
(ULIMO), and they attacked Taylor and the NPFL with the apparent 
support of ECOMOG. 
A cease-fire agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin under the 
auspices ofECOWAS, the OAU, and the U.N. The agreement, known 
as the "Cotonou Accord," added troops from Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe to the ECOWAS force. The U.N. Security Council then es-
tablished the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia [UNOMIL] 
to oversee the five-member transitional council created by the Coto-
nou Accord. Despite these measures, leaders of the three warring fac-
tions continued to harbor distrust of one another and the transitional 
government. A new peace initiative was put in place; however, a last-
ing peace failed because the initiative did not include the new faction 
that emerged after the Cotonou Accord. As a result, Liberia reverted 
to its pre-ECOMOG intervention condition. The civil war continued 
sporadically until the establishment of another interim government 
and the holding of the elections that led to the presidency of Charles 
Taylor. 
141 See David Wippman, Enfurcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in EN-
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The Liberian Civil War shocked Africans, and indeed much of 
the world, by the extent of its carnage and human tragedy. From the 
standpoint of international law, the war provided a classic case study 
of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law. It also 
revived the persistent political and academic controversy as to the le-
gitimacy of humanitarian intervention in the domestic affairs of a 
sovereign state. Additionally, it brought into sharp focus the permissi-
ble role of regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and 
security. 
Article 52 of the U.N. Charter permits regional organizations to 
secure peace and security in their area of interest. Art. 52(1) states: 
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of 
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such 
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided 
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are 
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations.142 
Art. 53 ( 1) further states: 
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such 
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action 
under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies 
without the authorization of the Security Council ... until 
such time as the Organization may, on request of the Gov-
ernments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for 
preventing further aggression by such a state.143 
Therefore, two issues could be raised regarding the authority for the 
ECOWAS intervention: (1) whether ECOWAS is a regional organiza-
tion under Article 52 ( 1); and (2) under what conditions are regional 
organizations authorized to take enforcement action pursuant to Ar-
ticle 52(1)?144 
To qualify as a regional organization under Article 52, ECOWAS, 
as a regional arrangement, must deal with matters relating to the 
142 U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1. 
143 Id. art. 53, para. 1. 
144 Anthony Chukwuka Ofodile, The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, 32 Co-
LUM.J. ThANSNAT'L L. 381,410 (1994). 
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maintenance of international peace and security; it must have a direct 
relation to the region.145 First, while ECOWAS began purely as an 
economic union, it later incorporated into its charter the Protocol on 
Non-Aggression and the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on 
Defense. These agreements authorized mutual assistance to settle dis-
putes between states and assistance for internal disputes that were 
supported by outside forces. The protocols did not seem to have ad-
dressed internal conflicts. 
Second, while the ultimate authority for determining what consti-
tutes a threat to peace rests with the U.N. Security Council, regional 
organizations may call attention to threats to international peace and 
request authorization to take action themselves if a U.N. Security 
Council response is not forthcoming. Third, apart from the right to 
self-defense, enforcement action may be taken by a regional organiza-
tion upon direct authorization from the Security Council. In sum, 
ECOWAS enforcement action could only be justified if it were: ( 1) an 
act of self-defense; (2) an act performed as a regional organization 
with the prior sanction of the Security Council; or (3) a peacekeeping 
action performed as a regional organization with the full consent of 
its members and in accordance with the U.N. Charter. 
In his discussion of the ECOWAS involvement in Liberia, Ofodile 
concludes that the intervention "does not have any solid anchor in 
international law. "146 He has strong doubts about the validity of hu-
manitarian intervention in general, and he asserts that even if the lat-
ter doctrine were valid, the ECOWAS intervention did not meet the 
avowed criteria for such validity. Furthermore, ECOWAS seemed to 
have acted beyond the powers granted to regional organizations by 
the U.N. Charter, since it failed to obtain the prior consent of theSe-
curity Council. 
What needs to be emphasized, however, is that prior consent of 
the U.N. Security Council is not always possible. When large numbers 
of people are being tortured and slaughtered as the international 
community and the Security Council take their time to deliberate and 
reach a decision on possible intervention, it should be quite appro-
priate for a regional organization to act swiftly while continuing to 
seek approval and ratification by the Security Council. Indeed, in the 
case of ECOMOG, the Security Council not only recognized ECOWAS 
as an Article 52 regional organization, but subsequently issued a reso-
145 jULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 247-49 (1959). 
146 Ofodile, supra note 144, at 418. 
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lution imposing an arms embargo on Taylor and his NPFL forces and 
adopted other pro-ECOWAS measures.l47 
Moreover, we should take pains to distinguish between permissi-
ble actions under the U.N. Charter and decisions or actions of U.N. 
organs in specific situations. If we merely postulate that there is no 
validity for humanitarian intervention in cases where intervention is 
undertaken by a group of states rather than by troops deployed by the 
U.N., we rigidly commit ourselves to an understanding of the U.N. 
Charter that eliminates other plausible interpretations of Articles 2(4) 
and 2(7). It would be more defensible to assert that there is no right 
of humanitarian intervention if the intervening states undertake such 
measures outside the parameters of the U.N. Charter. This proposi-
tion does not confine intervention to U.N. peacekeeping operations 
stricto sensu. If the Security Council failed to act within three weeks of 
raging fratricide in country X, is it unthinkable to find a Charter vali-
dation of humanitarian intervention by a group of neighboring states 
during the fourth week? 
ECOWAS deserved to be applauded in its intervention in Liberia 
despite its shortcomings. As a regional economic integration group 
that was still struggling to realize its primary goals of tariff elimina-
tion, free movement of factors of production, and a single monetary 
zone, it had the courage to establish a regional military arrangement 
to intervene and stop untold human suffering. At a time when the 
U.N. Security Council was vacillating, and the individual powerful 
countries of the world did not seem to give sufficient concern to the 
Liberian crisis, ECOWAS through ECOMOG acted commendably for 
the Liberian people and for Mrica as a whole. 
IV. RENDERING HuMANITARIAN INTERVENTION MoRE AccEPTABLE 
AND MORE IN COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 
A. Criteria for Legitimate Humanitarian Intervention 
Walzer, the moral philosopher, has argued that the principle of 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states follows from 
what he terms the "legalist paradigm" of international relations.l48 
This paradigm embodies the following set of propositions: 
147 S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3138th mtg., n 2, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 
(1992). 
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[T]here exists an international society of independent 
states .... International [s]ociety has a law that establishes 
the right of its members, above all the rights of territorial in-
tegrity and political sovereignty .... Any use of force or im-
minent threat of force by one state against the political sov-
ereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes 
aggression and is a criminal act .... Aggression justifies two 
kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense, and a war of 
law enforcement by the victim and any other member of in-
ternational society .... Nothing but aggression can justify 
war .... Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed 
it can also be punished .... 149 
43 
In the face of this paradigm, military intervention by a state or group 
of states could literally constitute aggression even if carried out with 
the highest of motives if not done to repel an earlier aggression or as 
a form of international law enforcement. 
However, Walzer is quick to add that we do not treat all interven-
tions as a form of aggression; for the legalist paradigm contains within 
itself the element of exceptions, or "the rule of disregard. "15° "The 
paradigm, unrevised, cannot account for the moral realities of mili-
tary intervention. "151 For one thing, intervention could be part of col-
lective self-defense of the victim of aggression, involving the military 
repulsion and punishment of the aggressor through temporary re-
verse occupation. Moreover, intervention cannot be confined to col-
lective self-defense against international aggression, for in the case of 
humanitarian intervention in a civil war, there is no clear aggressor to 
repulse and punish. An intervention to prevent massacre, mass starva-
tion, enslavement, etc., would certainly represent a second plausible 
revision of the legalist paradigm. Walzer argues, "when the violation 
of human rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it makes 
talk of community or self-determination ... seem cynical and irrele-
vant,"152 and "when a government turns savagely upon its own people, 
we must doubt the very existence of a political community to which 
the idea of self-determination might apply. "153 
149 Id. at 61-62. 
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Nonetheless, Walzer is correct in insisting that, since intervention 
often threatens the territorial integrity and political independence of 
invaded states, it must be justified. The burden of proof, according to 
Walzer, falls on any political leader who tries to shape the domestic 
arrangements or alter the conditions of life in a foreign country. This 
burden applies to an international organization as well. For what one 
state cannot do, a group of states are not permitted to do simply by 
virtue of sheer numbers. Granted the existence of a plausible and al-
most incontrovertible revision of the legalist paradigm in the case of 
humanitarian intervention, specific cases of humanitarian interven-
tion always stand in need of justification. Walzer points out that we 
typically confront "mixed cases where the humanitarian motive is one 
among several. "154 There are clear rescue and emergency relief situa-
tions, but there may also be cases of economic interest, strategic con-
siderations, plain-faced expansionism, and "benevolent imperialism." 
As he explains, "we worry that, under the cover of humanitarianism, 
states will come to coerce and dominate their neighbors. "155 
If we conclude with the proposition that the U.N. Charter did not 
remove the customary international law practice of humanitarian in-
tervention, and that Articles 2(4), 2(7), and 51 could be read to allow 
intervention under certain circumstances, then our major task is to 
define the criteria for appraisal of the legality of alleged cases of hu-
manitarian intervention. In other words, we must outline parameters 
that would help us define the permissible forms and instances of in-
tervention. This is where Fonteyne and others have made a major 
contribution to international law by attempting to define criteria for 
assessing the legality of claims of intervention in aid of human rights 
protection. 
Rougier was among the first writers to spell out an integral list of 
criteria for permissible intervention. He favored collective, disinter-
ested intervention with the widest possible authority on a variety of 
policy and legal grounds.156 Although he favored collective action, he 
emphasizes authority, which is increased if it is backed by traditionally 
powerful states. He lists three criteria for intervention: (1) the motiva-
tion to intervene comes from acts of state and not of individuals; (2) 
the acts in question violate the laws of humanity (rights to life, liberty, 
154 !d. 
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and legality), not merely national positive law; and (3) that the inter-
vention fulfill certain "circumstantial requirements," such as oppor-
tunities for success, and the extent of the violation, etc. 
Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, in his seminal 1974 article,l57 attempted to 
set forth more detailed criteria for judging the validity of particular 
cases of humanitarian intervention. He broke down his criteria into 
three subcategories: substantial, procedural, and preferential. 
1. Substantive Criteria 
A balance ought to be struck between the degree of destruction 
caused by the intervention and the importance of the rights being 
violated. As the unilateral use of force to prevent human rights viola-
tion is an extraordinary measure, it ought to be used only in response 
to substantial human rights violations on a large scale. However, gross 
violations to a smaller population may warrant the same reaction as 
lesser violations to a large population. The overall harshness of the 
violation, considering the extent of violation, numbers of people af-
fected, and persistence, should be weighed against the degree of de-
struction necessary to halt the violations. This is the essence of Fon-
teyne's obscure "cost-benefit" component of his criteria. If the 
violation is imminent or is actually taking place, a greater urgency for 
action exists. However, this ought not to be taken lightly. Rather the 
interventionist must be certain that the violation is imminent and will 
occur without intervention.l58 
We should consider the degree of relative disinterestedness of the 
intervenors. At its best, humanitarian intervention is altruistic. Yet, 
there is the tendency of most states not to get involved unless there is 
some political or national incentive for them. However, the "disinter-
estedness" standard is not to be taken as an absolute, as long as the 
overriding motive is the protection of human rights.159 Furthermore, 
there should not be an unnecessary use of force. If force is necessary, 
it should be as unobtrusive as possible. There should also be no un-
necessary "affectation" of the authority structures of the target state. 
In all aspects, the intervention should reflect humanitarian goals.l60 
There should be no unnecessary duration of the operation; the inter-
vention ought to last only for the period required to effect the hu-
157 See Fonteyne, supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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manitarian changes necessary to prevent the violations of rights and 
to help ensure the continued existence of that situation. 
2. Procedural Criteria 
Given the U.N.'s goal of conflict minimization, force ought to be 
the last resort. Universal and regional organizations are best suited for 
humanitarian intervention in a manner that is consistent with the in-
terests of the world or regional community. Unilateral intervention 
should be taken only after it is apparent that such an organization will 
not take any effective action.161 In order to assure acceptable levels of 
disinterest on the part of the interventionist, they ought to declare 
their motives as soon as possible to the world and regional organiza-
tions for appraisal,162 
3. Preferential Criteria 
To the extent possible, even when there is no action by interna-
tional organizations, collective intervention is preferred over individ-
ual or unilateral measures,l63 Unilateral intervention ought to be 
avoided if possible by obtaining the clear and unambiguous consent 
or invitation of the de jure government of the state where the interven-
tion is to take place.164 Yet, absence of consent sought does not pre-
clude the possibility of humanitarian intervention provided all the 
other requirements have been met)65 
Fonteyne's cost-benefit analysis in this context calls for comment. 
It refers to the need "to balance the destruction that intervention 
would cause, and the size of the group affected by the violations, as 
well as the fundamental character of the threatened human rights. "166 
"The preservation of values to be achieved by intervention must be 
weighed against the extent of the disruption of internal structures 
and domestic processes that will necessarily result from the foreign 
action. "167 Fonteyne himself admits that this criterion might be an ex-
tremely difficult one to apply due to its highly subjective character. 
One might add that it could also lead to callous decisions against in-
161 See id. 
162 See Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 266-67. 
163 Jd. 
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tervention in desperately needed situations; for Fonteyne is of the fol-
lowing view: 
Even in an extreme case of violation of the most fundamen-
tal human rights of a large group of people (such as in the 
case of the organized policy of genocide ... ), foreign inter-
vention of a forceful nature would probably not be war-
ranted if there is a reasonable prospect that the deprivations 
will end in the immediate future as a result of internal politi-
cal or other processes. "168 
The criterion regarding the "avoidance of any unnecessary affec-
tation of the authority structures of the state intervened in" also re-
quires clarification. What this means is that there should be a severe 
limitation on alterations by the interventionist of the internal author-
ity structures of that state, and that any action in that direction should 
be limited to those situations where "the overthrow of the government 
in power or even secession of a part of the population appears to be 
the only available means of putting an end to ongoing or threatened 
human rights violations of particular gravity. "169 In this regard, Moore 
has remarked correctly that if the protection of human rights requires 
the overthrow of authority structures it would seem best to require 
U.N. authorization as a prerequisite for action. "To allow unilateral 
action in such cases would be to permit all manner of self-serving 
claims for the overthrow of authority structures. "170 
B. Some Nagging Operational Problems of United Nations 
Humanitarian Intervention 
When we contemplate the legality of humanitarian intervention, 
we must presume that collective action in the context of U.N. or re-
gional organizations is more likely to ensure the relative purity of in-
tentions required from the intervenors. This is not always forthcom-
ing, and that explains why we are forced to grapple with the possibility 
of individual states undertaking that responsibility. 
Clearly, U.N. intervention presents an easier case of humanitar-
ian intervention. The deployment of armed U.N. peacekeeping forces 
can be presented partly as a case of diplomatic intervention. It is dip-
168 /d. 
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lomatic to the extent that peacekeepers are generally deployed with 
the consent of the conflicting parties as part of the diplomatic proc-
ess; but it is also forcible intervention to the extent that the personnel 
are members of armed forces. However, because U.N. peacekeeping 
generally partakes of the diplomatic process, it makes it less offensive 
and therefore more acceptable both in principle and in practice. Fon-
teyne's criteria outlined above quite clearly favors action by interna-
tional organizations. First, global organizations, such as the U.N., 
through the Security Council; then regional organizations such as 
NATO and the OAU; and finally, subregional groups such as ECO-
MOG/ECOWAS in West Mrica. 
A general policy to lodge decisions on robust peacekeeping 
firmly in the hands of the U.N. Security Council, rather than with in-
dividual states or groups of states certainly blunts the image of self-
aggrandizement and imperialism frequently associated with all forms 
of humanitarian intervention. Certainly, the loathsome feelings 
against intervening neighbors as meddlesome bystandards are dis-
placed in the case of a multinational force established by the Security 
Council to deal with crimes against humanity and war crimes. Re-
gional organizations such as NATO and ECOMOG/ECOWAS may 
also act appropriately under Article 52 of the U.N. Charter if the U.N. 
as a global institution does not wish to act in a timely fashion, so long 
as the Security Council is apprised of the conflict and intended action 
and expressly or tacitly approves it. 
Indeed, there is the belief that the future of effective peacekeep-
ing belongs to regional organizations such as ECOMOG. Thus, Mi-
chael Hirsh has argued that in the current post-Cold War period, nei-
ther the United States nor the U.N.: 
[A] cting separately or in concert, could become some form 
of globo-cop . ... Washington does not have the will for it, and 
the U.N. (thanks largely to American stinginess) does not 
have the way .... [A] new system is emerging on the ground, 
crisis by crisis. Call it the rule of the regia-cops. It is a hybrid sys-
tem, dependent on both U.N. legitimization and local mus-
cle.I71 
However, the preeminent role of the U.N. Security Council in 
this conceptualization does carry with it a number of actual and po-
171 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 2-3 (emphasis added). 
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tential concerns worthy of consideration and resolution. Goulding 
has identified five such areas of concern.l72 
1. By what criteria should the Security Council decide to use 
force? These criteria need to be well defined in order to avoid charges 
of double standards. In a possibly oblique reference to the attitude of 
the international community towards Israel in respect of the Middle 
East crisis, Goulding states: 
There may be sound reasons why it is right to use force 
against Iraq, but not against other member states which con-
tinue to occupy their neighbor's territory contrary to theSe-
curity Council's wishes .... But if the Security Council is to 
escape the charge of double standards, ... [the Council] 
and especially its western members, . . . need to be more 
careful in defining those reasons and getting them ac-
cepted.173 
Moreover, the Security Council will have to explain why it appears 
more ready and willing to intervene in some parts of the world than 
in others. Why intervene to save human lives and reduce oppression 
in Bosnia and Kurdish Iraq, but not to the same degree in Rwanda or 
Angola? 
2. How can the Security Council ensure that its use of force will 
succeed? Success is important to the credibility of the organization. 
The answer to the dilemma lies in the very careful appreciation of the 
military task and the deployment of sufficient force to ensure its suc-
cess. In addition, a credible and practical end game must be defined 
so that withdrawal of the U.N. does not result in further problems. 
3. Is the international community ready to pay for increased en-
forcement? Enforcement is vastly more expensive than peacekeeping. 
Some mechanism whereby the enforcement costs would be borne col-
lectively by all member states would be preferable if enforcement is to 
increase the credibility of collective security. The ICJ established this 
principle for U.N. peacekeeping operations in the 1960s.174 
4. Will enough member states be willing to contribute to en-
forcement operations given the increased risk of casualties? How 
many of those with the will and desire have the armament and train-
ing capabilities to engage in combat operations in unfamiliar terrain? 
172 See Goulding, supra note 14, at 461-63. 
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It is desirable that any enforcement deployment would have troop 
contributions from a wide cross-section of the U.N. to reflect the 
composition of the organization. 
5. How should command and control of peacekeeping opera-
tions be organized in the future? The existing structures at U.N. 
Headquarters in New York have found it increasingly difficult to meet 
the demands of increased peacekeeping activity. This is due to the fact 
that the command and control requirements of forcible intervention 
far exceed those of peacekeeping. 
Indeed, problems of command and control and the extent of 
U.N. member states' commitment to multilateral peacekeeping were 
highlighted in the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), a recent 
U.S. policy document on peacekeeping issued by the Clinton Admini-
stration in 1994. Even as the then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali was reiterating his support for a U.N. standing army in October, 
1994,175 the sole superpower and the highest single financial contribu-
tor to the U.N. had just published a document on U.S. involvement in 
future U.N. peacekeeping operations whose implementation was 
bound to impinge upon the effectiveness of the unified nature of 
U.N. peacekeeping operations.176 
The PDD addresses six major issues in potential U.S. involvement 
in U.N. peacekeeping operations: (1) making choices about which 
U.N. peacekeeping operations the United States will support; (2) re-
ducing U.S. costs for U.N. operations; (3) U.S. policy regarding the 
command and control of American military forces in U.N. operations; 
(4) reforming and improving the U.N.'s capability to manage peace 
operations; (5) improving the way the U.S. government manages and 
funds peace operations; and (6) creating better forms of cooperation 
between the U.S. Executive, Congress, and the American public on 
U.N. peace operations. Of the greatest relevance to this Article are 
the prescriptions on U.S.'s potential participation in peacekeeping 
operations, the reduction of costs, and the thorny issue of command 
and control in relation to U.S. forces. 
175 See Karen Breslau, Interview of Boutros-Ghali, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1994, at 52. 
176 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 13. The paper referred hereto 
is a summary of a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), signed on May 3, 1994 by Presi-
dent Clinton. The PDD was the product of an inter-agency review involving the following 
offices: The State Department; the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; the U.S. mission to the United Nations; the Office of Management & Budget; the 
Central Intelligence Agency; and the National Security Council. See id. 
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As for the first matter, the PDD distinguishes between three cate-
gories of decisions and assigns differing levels and combinations of 
factors that enter into the decision-making process. There are situa-
tions in which the United States will merely vote for the establishment 
of a U.N. peacekeeping operation without necessarily participating in 
the operation itself. The United States may also vote for and decide to 
participate in such an operation, without the United States assuming 
any significant role therein. Then there are the cases in which the 
United States will vote for an operation and make a significant com-
mitment of her military personnel. The factors taken into account in 
the decision making process become more involved as one moves 
higher up the ladder within those three categories. 
Where the United States is simply deciding whether to vote for 
any kind of U.N. peacekeeping operations, the following factors will 
be taken into account:I77 
(1) To what extent would U.S. involvement advance U.S. 
interests? 
(2) Is there "an international community of interest" in 
handling the problem at hand on a multilateral, i.e., global, 
basis? 
(3) Does the situation constitute a breach of, or a threat 
to, international peace and security, either in terms of inter-
national aggression or of urgent humanitarian disaster cou-
pled with violence? 
(4) Has there been a sudden interruption of "established 
democracy" or a gross violation of human rights, coupled 
with violence or the threat of violence? 
(5) Does the proposed mission have clear objectives, along 
with the anticipated duration tied to these objectives; and 
has it set out realistic criteria for ending the operation? 
(6) Does the mission indicate where it fits "on the spec-
trum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforce-
ment?" If the mission is billed as a traditional peacekeeping 
operation, is a cease-fire in place; and is there consent of the 
parties for the deployment of peacekeeping forces? 
(7) If the mission is viewed as one of peace enforcement, 
how significant is the threat to international peace and secu-
rity? 
177 See id. at 11. 
52 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:1 
(8) How available are the means for the accomplishment 
of the mission, including the required forces and finances, 
and the appropriate coverage ofthe mandate? 
(9) Are the political, economic, and humanitarian conse-
quences of inaction considered unacceptable? 
U.S. authorities are expected to make decisions on the cumula-
tive weight of all the relevant factors without assigning any particular 
weight to any single factor. It appears that most of these factors ad-
dress Fonteyne's substantive criteria for justified intervention, while a 
few are more relevant to his procedural and preferential criteria. 
Needless to say, however, Fonteyne's specific responses to aspects of 
these criteria, as well as the weight to be given to the stated factors, 
might have reflected a different value set from that of officials of the 
U.S. State and Defense Departments called upon to make decisions 
on, for example, Rwanda, Haiti, or the former YUgoslavia. 
Where the United States is called upon to contribute personnel 
to U.N. operations, additional factors come into play in the decision 
making process. Here, U.S. national interests come to the forefront 
more explicitly than in the more general decision to approve a pro-
posed U.N. operation.J78 Whenever U.S. personnel are expected to 
participate at any level in the operation, the United States would wish 
to assure itself that: 
(1) The mission would advance U.S. national interests; 
that risks to American personnel have been weighed, and 
that such risks are acceptable presumably to U.S. decision-
makers and ultimately to the American people; 
(2) U.S. participation is indeed necessary for the opera-
tion's success; 
(3) An endpoint for U.S. personnel participation can be 
identified in the mission plan; 
(4) U.S. personnel, funds, and other resources are avail-
able; 
( 5) The Executive Branch can marshal domestic and con-
gressional support for the U.N. operation; and 
(6) The command and control arrangements as they af-
fect U.S. personnel are acceptable to the U.S. authorities. 
178 See id. at 12. 
2002] Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping 53 
Finally, if U.S. personnel are to be called upon to contribute in a 
significant manner to the success of an operation under Chapter 7 of 
the U.N. Charter, i.e., enforcement measures, U.S. authorities will 
consider three additional criteria: 
(1) Is there a determination to commit sufficient (multi-
lateral) forces to achieve the objectives? 
(2) Is there a plan to achieve these objectives in a decisive 
manner? 
(3) Is there a commitment "to reassess and adjust" the 
size, composition, and disposition of U.S. forces as necessary 
to attain the stated objectives? 
The internationally accepted perspective on the four issues raised 
above is that a U.N. operation does not cease to be such an operation 
just because troops from major powers, or indeed from a superpower, 
are involved. If it is a U.N. operation, then the U.N. Secretary-General 
is administratively in charge of appointments, including the appoint-
ment of field commanders and their immediate assistants, unless the 
Security Council directs otherwise.I79 
At the same time, a U.N. operation, typically made up of troops 
from various parts of the world, starts off with different levels of pro-
fessional competence and military resources. Contingents from cer-
tain countries might feel professionally superior and display this as-
sumed superiority. There also might be differences in the foreign 
policy objectives of contributing states in regards to the particular 
geopolitical area of conflict. Will a particular nation seek to push its 
foreign policy agenda under the cover of a multilateral force? Finally, 
in the case of contributory states with a vigorous electorate and highly 
vocal public opinion holding a delicate democratic balance between 
the supporters and opponents of the government, the executive deci-
sion makers will continue to put a rather heavy weight on public atti-
tudes to perceived and actual risks to their troops in the field. 
Part of the PDD dealt with a rather touchy issue in command and 
control, namely, whether and to what extent U.S. troops should come 
under the control of non-U.S. military commanders within a multilat-
eral force)BO The document makes a distinction between command 
and control and "operational control." The former is defined as "the 
179 This was amply demonstrated by the U.N. command structure in the Congo Crisis 
in 1960, and many other U.N. missions since then. 
180 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 13, at 16. 
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authority to issue orders covering every aspect of military operations 
and administration. "181 Operational control, on the other hand, is 
viewed as a subset of command, involving the authority given for a 
specific time frame "to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by 
the President." The PDD insists that the U.S. President "will never re-
linquish command authority over U.S. forces," but allows the Presi-
dent on a case by case basis to consider placing appropriate U.S. 
forces under the operational control of a competent U.N. com-
mander for specific U.N. operations authorized by the Security Coun-
cil. This may be done if it is to the advantage of the United States. 
Even in such cases, "the fundamental elements of U.S. command" will 
apply, including the capability of U.S. commanders to report sepa-
rately to higher U.S. military authorities and to the U.N. Commander, 
and the right of the United States to take whatever actions it deems 
necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered. 
The Directive claims that "unity of command" remains a vital 
concern of the U.S. decision-makers. Yet, the tensions that may result 
from insistence on the so-called fundamental elements of U.S. com-
mand are not adequately resolved. In other words, when the rules of 
the U.N. unity of command clash head-on with those fundamental 
elements of U.S. command, which set of rules will govern? Indeed, 
the problems of command and control, and the sometimes unhappy 
mix of global and regional arrangements in this endeavor, came to 
the fore in Bosnia towards the end of the tenure of Boutros-Boutros 
Ghali as U.N. Secretary General. 
In a report submitted in late 1994 to the Security Council on the 
future of U.N. forces in Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali laid out the options 
then open to the international community as he saw it.182 The U.N. 
could either scale down the scope of its mandate to do what was pos-
sible as a traditional peacekeeping force, approve a more expansive 
mandate, or hand over to another international force, presumably 
under the authority of the appropriate Security Council Resolutions. 
The closest parallel to the third option would have been the role 
played by the United States, France, and Britain in the Iraq-Kuwait 
crisis under the rubric of various U.N. Security Council Resolutions. 
However, the Secretary General's first option of scaling down 
U.N. troops appeared to run counter to moves already made on the 
181 See id at 15. 
182 See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Securiiy Council Resolutions 982 (1995) and 
987 (1995), U.N. SCORat U 72-79, U.N. Doc. S/1995/444 (1995). 
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ground in Bosnia by the United States and two Security Council 
members with the most troops in the area, Britain and France. These 
countries were already massing their troops to give them enhanced 
capability to carry out humanitarian and "protection" activities. The 
debate on the Secretary General's report clearly constituted a land-
mark in the conception and the role of the U.N. force in the former 
Yugoslavia. The U.N. had certainly reached the crossroads from 
peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Russia's original opposition to 
the whole idea of adding more troops to create a Rapid Reaction 
Force (RRF) finally subsided, and the main question then became the 
composition and structure for such a force. 
As it turned out, the RRF was finally established in December, 
1995 under the name of Implementation Force (IFOR).l83 IFOR was 
given a good deal of discretion and flexibility to take all necessary 
measures to protect their troops in the performance of their man-
date, including strong elements of enforcement.l84 Further, the reso-
lution made it clear that there would be a "unified command and 
control" under NAT0.185 The U.N. Secretary-General's report ac-
companying the resolution added that the incumbent U.N. Peace 
Force Commander, who was then the foremost military authority in 
the theatre of conflict reporting to the Secretary-General, was to be-
come the Deputy Commander of IFOR.l86 Quite clearly, the U.N. had 
been assigned to a position of less authority in the new arrangement. 
!FOR was seen essentially as a multinational force dedicated to peace 
enforcement and the protection of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, but set 
apart from the latter as a U.N. agency. If so, should this multinational 
force be partly financed by the U.N. or by the troop-contributing 
countries alone? Such questions, easy to pose but often hard to an-
swer in meaningful practical terms, would continue to bedevil the 
execution of humanitarian intervention in the multilateral mode. 
For some time now, the U.N. itself has become rather dissatisfied 
with its own effectiveness in peacekeeping operations, as well as with 
some of the assumptions embedded in the received peacekeeping 
doctrine over the past fifty years. As part of an effort to improve 
peacekeeping both doctrinally and operationally, the current U.N. 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, set up an independent panel on 
m See S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg. 1 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1031 
(1995). 
184 See id. n 15, 17. 
185 See id. n 12, 14. 
186 See generally id. 
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United Nations Peace Operations, 'The Brahimi Panel, "187 in March, 
2000 to make a set of recommendations for improvement. On August 
21, 2000, the Brahimi Panel released its report,188 which addressed 
several pertinent issues. Mter throwing doubt on the relevance of the 
"prior consent" notion of peacekeeping in the conduct of intra-state 
conflicts, the report maintains that peacekeepers must be able to de-
fend themselves and their mandate with "robust rules of engage-
ment. "189 An under-funded and resource-strapped peacekeeping mis-
sion serves no one's interest. Thus, the Security Council should not 
finalize resolutions authorizing large peacekeeping missions until 
member states have pledged the necessary troops and resources.190 
The Security Council, in its resolutions and other directives, 
should reflect the clarity of purpose and unity of effort that are re-
quired for successful peacekeeping operations, particularly when de-
ployment is to take place in very dangerous situations.l91 While not 
calling for a standing U.N. army, the Brahimi Panel nonetheless 
summons member states to work together to form "coherent, multi-
national, brigade-sized forces," ready for effective deployment within 
defined time-lines. Also, each state is called upon to establish a na-
tional pool of military and civilian police officers and other specialists 
in readiness for such deployment.192 Peacekeeping support staff at 
U.N. Headquarters must be strengthened, with an increase in fund-
ing.193 Peacekeeping ought to be treated as a "core activity" of the 
U.N. rather than as a "temporary responsibility." Thus, headquarters 
support of peace operations should be funded through the regular 
U.N. budget, instead of the "Support Account" which is meant to be 
justified year by year and post by post.194 
The Brahimi Panel clearly understands the critical role of the 
Security Council members and troop-contributing countries in the 
success or failure of projected missions. It therefore poignantly calls 
upon the U.N. Secretariat to "tell the Security Council what it needs 
to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mis-
187 Named after its Chairman, former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi. 
188 See Comprehensive Review of the Whole QJ.testion of Peacekeeping operations in AU their As-
pects, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000) [hereinafter Com-
prehensive Review]. 
189 Id. at 10, t 55. 
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sion mandates. "195 Such candor will, no doubt, enhance the degree of 
preparedness of peacekeepers in aid of humanitarian intervention. 
CONCLUSION 
From the 1860s onwards, philosophers and legal scholars seemed 
increasingly receptive to the suggested legal validity of humanitarian 
intervention by individual states or group of states, acting outside the 
auspices of any international organization.l96 In the period immedi-
ately preceding World War I, the majority of writers had apparently 
accepted the legality of humanitarian intervention, even though there 
were still strong opponents of this position.197 It seems fair to assert 
that immediately prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945, 
humanitarian intervention was a fairly settled practice under custom-
ary international law, even if there was never unanimity on its legal 
status. 
By the end of World War II, and certainly after the formation of 
the U.N. in 1945, Sir Harley Shawcross could confidently declare, at 
the Nuremberg Trials in 1946, that, "the right of humanitarian inter-
vention, in the name of the rights of man trampled upon by the state 
in a manner offensive to the feelings of humanity, has been recog-
nized long ago as an integral part of the Law of Nations. "198 However, 
some scholars still raise the uncomfortable but legitimate question 
whether this right of intervention survived the U.N. Charter, in view 
of the well-established principle of non-intervention codified in Arti-
cles 2(4) and 2(7) ofthe Charter. 
Over the past two decades, there have been quite a few dramatic 
cases of unilateral military interventions, some of which have been 
castigated as self-serving and thus not motivated primarily by humani-
tarian goals. There have also been various U.N. peacekeeping opera-
tions, including those in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which had 
strong elements of humanitarian intervention. 
Whatever the strengths of some of the doctrinal objections to 
humanitarian intervention, it is the view of this writer that the world 
cannot sit by in the name of a single doctrine of international law, i.e., 
195 /d. at 54, t 4(d). 
196 See Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 219. 
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non-intervention, while human beings are being butchered and tor-
tured on a wide and persistent scale by their own governments, or by 
factions in a civil war; or when human populations are subjected to 
starvation and epidemic diseases as a result of political conflicts. 
There are other international law doctrines that will justify humanitar-
ian intervention, especially if they are embarked upon by U.N. sanc-
tioned regional and multilateral forces. The minimization of conflict 
is not an absolute virtue that ought to be pursued at the cost of all 
other virtues; it ought to be balanced with other virtues, including the 
promotion of respect for certain fundamental human rights. 
Further, so long as we insist on the need for a well-defined set of 
criteria, it might be advisable, given the inability or unwillingness of 
international bodies to react to all cases of grave human rights abuses, 
to legally recognize that in these extreme situations a state may be 
temporarily relieved from its Article 2(4) restraints in order to take 
unilateral action to enforce critical rights. As Lillich stated thirty-four 
years ago, "to require a state to sit back and watch the slaughter of 
innocent people in order to avoid violating blanket prohibitions 
against the use of force is to stress black letter at the expense of far 
more fundamental values. "199 
When humanitarian interventions are undertaken not just in ac-
cordance with the U.N. Charter, but by U.N. peacekeepers or regional 
groups ratified by the U.N., the case for humanitarian intervention 
rests on even more solid ground. Even so, the multinational mode of 
intervention poses its own special problems, including the matter of 
command and control and the difficulty of implementing the gener-
ally agreed concept of unity of command. States contributing to U.N. 
robust peacekeeping operations should strive to downplay their paro-
chial military professionalism and eschew narrow foreign policy 
agendas in the theatres of conflict. Only from this unified perspective 
and modus operandi can robust peacekeeping deliver a devastating 
blow to the forces of darkness that make humanitarian intervention a 
necessary part of our moral and legal duty. 
199 Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help to Protect Human Rights, 53 IowA L. REv. 344, 344 
(1967). 
